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CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE
OF LAW AND RELIGION: PRIVACY V.
PIETY-HAS THE SUPREME COURT
PETERED OUT?
MATTHEW A. RITTER, M.DIv. J.D., PH.D.1
INTRODUCTION
"Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof....-2
As the story goes,3 He came gently and unobtrusively; but
everyone recognized Him. The people are drawn to Him and
follow Him about. An infinite compassion radiates from His
silent smile. He touches them, blesses them, and heals them.
The Grand Inquisitor passes by, watches a while, then has Him
arrested. After a lengthy tirade, the Inquisitor condemns Christ
for the dreadful freedom He granted humanity, which freedom
has been the cause of so much suffering, destruction, misery,
guilt, and hunger, because the "craving for universal unity is
1 Professor of Legal Skills at California Western School of Law, San Diego,
California. B.A., Rice University (philosophy/religious studies); M.Div., Boston
University School of Theology (biblical studies/ theology); S.T.M., Yale Divinity
School (philosophical theology); M.A., Yale University (philosophical-theological
hermeneutics); M.Phil., Yale University (history of philosophy/theology); Ph.D.,
Yale University (philosophical theology); J.D., California Western School of
Law. The author would like to express his appreciation to Thomas Jefferson
School of Law for the opportunity to participate in this symposium, and to
Professor Carol Berry for her continuing support.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. I.
3 Fyodor Dostoyevsky, The Grand Inquisitor, in THE BROTHERS KARAMAZOV
227, 229-44 (Manuel Komroff ed., Constance Garnett trans., Signet Classics
1957) (1881).
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the... last anguish of men."4  To the Inquisitor's
remonstrations, He has listened attentively. The Inquisitor
waits impatiently for His response, for an accounting, for an
explanation, "however bitter and terrible."5 At last, in answer,
He approaches the Inquisitor in silence, and kisses him on his
head. The Inquisitor trembles, then releases Him: 'Go, and
come no more."6
The civic arrest and subsequent banishment of religion from
the public domain has provided our American culture with
perhaps its governing ethical debate: is the moral fabric of
secular society pulling apart at its religious seams? Over the
course of the last two and a quarter centuries, religious matters
have increasingly been relegated to the private domain-
ostensibly to preserve the freedom of the individual for religion7
and to protect the freedom of society from religions in order to
establish a common secular unity. The American history of the
relationship between the civic and religious orders has informed,
moreover, our Supreme Court's jurisprudence on the separation
of Church and State-most poignantly so in decisions regarding
the inculcation of cultural values through the education of our
children. In this privacy versus piety debate, the central
jurisprudential issue now facing the Court is whether its dictated
posture of secularity in matters religious itself comprises a
religious stance. 9 Properly addressing this issue, however, will
involve not only an examination of the history of the Court's
4 Id. at 237.
5 Id. at 242.
6 Id. And for those who have thus managed to banish God, "everything is
lawful." Id. at 243.
7 See Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
IssuEs 313, 313 (1996) ("Religious liberty is first and foremost a guarantee of
liberty.... But religion is not guaranteed, and neither is secularism--only
liberty is guaranteed.").
8 See Michael W. McConnell, Five Reasons to Reject the Claim that
Religious Arguments Should be Excluded from Democratic Deliberations, 1999
UTAH L. REV. 639, 656-57 (1999) ("This view, called the 'principle of secular
rationale,' is put forward as a means of protecting the public sphere from
divisive, absolutist, intolerant impulses and from arguments that cannot be
supported on the basis of accessible public reasons.").
9 See Stephen L. Carter, Parents, Religion, and Schools: Reflections on
Pierce, 70 Years Later, 27 SETON HALL L. REV. 1194, 1212 (1997) ("[Ihf beginning
the school day with a prayer is unconstitutional because it prefers religion over
non-religion, then why is not -a curriculum devoid of any religious observance
unconstitutional because it prefers non-religion over religion?").
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separation of Church and State, but further inquiry into its
governing presumptions, both jurisprudential and theological, on
the nature and character of the relationship between law and
religion. The Supreme Court is not wont to address itself to such
inquiries; but where the brave of heart should fear to tread, there
shall we fools go.
Part I of this paper addresses the originating intent of the
separation of Church and State, then examines its nineteenth
century incarnation, with particular attention to educational
policy. It contends that the governing aim of this separation
devolved not from any antagonism to religion, but from a
constitutional anxiety to protect both religious and civil society
from what historically happens to each when they become
entangled. In this effort to preserve freedom, both civil freedom
from religious oppression and religious freedom from civil
oppression, however, the separation of Church and State covertly
valorized a Protestant religiosity that became indoctrinated in
the public schools and constitutionally protected as the
appropriate religious posture.
Part II examines the twentieth century construal of the
separation of Church and State under its governing logic of
secularity. Constitutional secularity has yielded two distinct
judicial stances toward religion: neutrality under the
establishment clause and accommodation under the free exercise
clause. The neutrality principle is driven by a constitutional
anxiety against placing governmental authority behind religion,
while the accommodation principle is driven by a constitutional
tolerance for religion as long as it does not intrude upon an
important governmental interest. Although complementary in
design, these two principles collide when religious neutrality
itself comprises the governmental interest to be protected against
the accommodation of religion. The twentieth century separation
of Church and State is thus sustained by a distinctly secular
concern to excise religion as a purely private matter from the
public domain-especially the public school domain-lest
religious influences unduly intrude upon the governmental
interest in religious neutrality. Initially construed to guarantee
a freedom for religion, the Constitution has become interpreted to
guarantee a freedom from religion. The exacerbated
privatization of religion overtly valorizes a cultural secularism
that has become indoctrinated in the public schools and
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constitutionally protected as the appropriate posture in matters
religious.
Part III reflects upon the hermeneutics of the secular effort
to abstract a universal morality of egalitarian regard for all
persons, attended by a heightened regard for privacy, from its
historically religious context. It argues that by virtue of its
abstraction from religion, the central moral conviction of our
secularly civic society lacks any moral force beyond its mere
social imposition. Secularism consequently construes religion as
potentially subversive, whose transcendent moral authority may
disoblige the religious adherent from the social imposition of civic
authority. Secular neutrality would thus domesticate religion in
order to neuter its transcendent moral force. Hence the "logic of
secular liberty" has governed the twentieth century
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court on matters religious-a logic
anxious to privatize religion so as to excise its potentially
coercive if not subversive influence from the public order. The
ultimate irony of this logic is that it devolves, and devolves only,
from a uniquely religious understanding of liberty.
Part IV demonstrates that the Judeo-Christian heritage
continues to provide for the central moral conviction of our civic
society. It further shows, however, that the secularization of this
heritage has transposed an other-regarding religious ethic into a
self-regarding secular ethic. Secular morality is thus a truncated
inversion of religious morality. By virtue of secularizing the
moral domain of religion, moreover, religion itself becomes
secularly misconstrued as the residual system of beliefs and
practices explicitly attendant to religion. Secularism therefore
marginalizes religion, banishing it to the purely private sphere,
from which private sphere it exerts no moral claim upon the
public sphere and thus poses little subversive harm to the civic
order. The judicial stance on prayer in school exemplifies this
logic. Properly understood, however, prayer-and therefore
religiosity itself-is a profoundly communal, and hence public
matter.
The concluding remarks illustrate that our Supreme Court
has indeed "petered out,"10 though impermissibly subscribing to a
10 After rebuking Him, Jesus said to Peter: "You are a hindrance to me; for
you are not on the side of God; but of men." Matthew 16:23 (New Oxford
Annotated Bible). Peter later thrice denied Him. Id. at 26:75.
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secular disestablishment of religion by virtue of endorsing the
secular misconstrual of the relationship between law and
religion. In consequence, the Supreme Court valorizes a secular
moral autonomy, but a moral autonomy which trades on a
truncated inversion of a distinctly religious theonomy.
A postscript addresses the impact of these reflections on the
constitutionality of student-initiated prayer in the public schools.
I. NON-SECTARIAN SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
"The religion of every man must be left to the conviction and
confidence of every man. In matters of religion no man's right is
to be abridged by the institution of civil society; religion is wholly
exempt from its competence."11
When the founders of this nation drafted its constitution,
they constructed a separation between civil and religious society.
In doing so, they distinguished our nation quite dramatically
from its heritage of British involvement with the Church of
England. The governing aim of this separation, however,
devolved not from an antagonism toward any particular religion
or religion in general, but rather from a constitutional anxiety to
protect both religious and civil society-not so much from each
other, but from what invariably and inevitably happens to each
when they entangle themselves. On the one hand, as James
Madison observed:
Torrents of blood have been spilt in the old world, by vain
attempts of the secular arm to extinguish Religious discord,
by proscribing all difference in Religious opinions. Time
has at length revealed the true remedy. Every relaxation
of narrow and rigorous policy, wherever it has been tried,
has been found to assuage the disease. The American
Theatre has exhibited proofs, that equal and complete
liberty, if it does not wholly eradicate it, sufficiently
destroys its malignant influence on the health and
prosperity of the state. 12
On the other hand, Thomas Jefferson reflected:
11 James Madison, quoted in Derek H. Davis, Assessing the Proposed
Religious Equality Amendment, 37 J. CHURCH & STATE 493, 508 (1995).
12 JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS
ESTABLISHMENTS 11 (1785), quoted in Douglas Laycock, Religious Liberty as
Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 313, 317 (1996).
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Whereas Almighty God hath created the mind free; that all
attempts to influence it by temporal punishments or
burthens, or by civil incapacitations, tend only to beget
habits of hypocrisy and meanness, and are a departure
from the plan of the Holy author of our religion, who being
Lord both of body and mind, yet chose not to propagate it
by coercions on either.13
Aligned with religion, the State becomes sectarian;14 aligned
with the government, the Church becomes coercive. 5 In either
event, freedom is sacrificed to oppression. The constitutional aim
of the separation of Church and State, therefore, was to preserve
freedom-both civil freedom from religious oppression and
religious freedom from civil oppression. As Douglas Laycock
rightly notes: "Religious liberty is first and foremost a guarantee
of liberty.... ."16 Consonant with the liberty aims of the balance
of the First Amendment, the religion clauses proscribing the
establishment of religion and prescribing the free exercise of
religion are clauses that promote the liberty of all persons to
fulfill their chosen duties to both Church and State without one
infringing upon the other.' 7 The constitutional separation of
13 Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty § 1 (1786), quoted in Michael W.
McConnell, Why is Religious Liberty the "First Freedom"?, 21 CARDOzO L. REV.
1243, 1251 (2000).
14 "[I]n history that was recent to the American Founders, governmental
attempts to suppress disapproved religious views had caused vast human
suffering in Europe and in England and similar suffering on a smaller scale in
the colonies that became the United States." Laycock, supra note 7, at 317.
15 "[Elach person [must be] free to pursue the good life in the manner and
season most agreeable to his or her conscience, which is the voice of God."
McConnell, supra note 13 at 1251-52.
16 Laycock, supra note 7, at 313. Laycock characterizes the twin liberty
aims of the religion clauses in terms of the complementary difference between
the establishment and free exercise clauses: "In general terms, the Free
Exercise Clause prohibits government suppression of religion; the
Establishment Clause forbids government support of religion." Id. at 340.
17 See McConnell, supra note 13, at 1244.
Long before liberalism was conceived in theory or in practice, the
division between temporal and spiritual authority gave rise to the
most fundamental features of liberal democratic order: the idea of
limited government, the idea of individual conscience and hence of
individual rights, and the idea of a civil society, as apart from
government, bearing primary responsibility for the formation and
transmission of opinions and ideas. These ideas came about not in
rebellion against religion, but in defense of religion against the
encroachment of the state.
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Church and State, therefore, did not reflect cultural antagonism
between law and religion. On the contrary, the reflections of our
founders manifest rather a concomitance of civic virtue and
religious piety, the latter generally taking precedence over the
former.18
Although the United States of America was perhaps the first
nation to constitute itself through a separation of Church and
State, the idea is quite old. Indeed, Jesus himself remonstrated:
"Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the
things that are God's."19 As applied to governmental affairs, the
idea was advanced in papal works of the fifth century,20 was
developed as the "two kingdoms" theory of Protestant theology,21
and informed leading political thinkers of the eighteenth century,
albeit not uncontrovertedly.22 The idea maintains its currency in
the late twentieth century deliberations of the Supreme Court:
[T]he lesson of history that was and is the inspiration for
the Establishment Clause [is] the lesson that in the hands
of government what might begin as a tolerant expression of
religious views may end in a policy to indoctrinate and
coerce. A state-created orthodoxy puts at grave risk that
18 "It is the duty of every man to render to the Creator such homage, and
such only, as he believes to be acceptable to him. This duty is precedent both in
order of time and degree of obligation, to the claims of Civil Society." JAMES
MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS § 1
(1785), quoted in McConnell, supra note 13, at 1246.
19 Mark 12:17 (New Oxford Annotated Bible).
20 McConnell, supra note 13, at 1245 (citing Brian Tierney, Religious
Rights: A Historical Perspective, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN WESTERN THOUGHT 29,
34 (Noel Reynolds & Cole Durhan, eds., 1996)).
21 McConnell, supra note 13, at 1245-46 ("Two-kingdoms theology conceived
of humans as owing allegiance to two different sets of authorities, the spiritual
and the temporal.") (citing 2 JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN
RELIGION 184 (Ford L. Battle ed. & trans., 1975)); MARTIN LUTHER, Temporal
Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed, in LUTHER'S WORKS 75, 81-129
(Walther I. Brandt ed., J.J. Schindel trans., 1962).
22 See McConnell, supra note 15, at 1248. John Locke, "esteem[ed] it above
all things necessary to distinguish exactly the business of civil government from
that of religion and to settle the just bounds that lie between the one and the
other." Id., (citing JOHN LOCKE, Essay on Toleration, in 6 THE WORKS OF JOHN
LOCKE 1, 9 (1689)). McConnell also notes, however; "The two-kingdoms view of
competing authorities is at the heart of our First Amendment."; but noting that
both Hobbes and Rousseau advocated instead a form of civil religion in order to
quell religiously motivated disobedience to the state. Id., (citing THOMAS
HOBBES, LEVIATHAN pt. III, ch. 42, at 567-71 (C.B. Macpherson ed., 1968)
(1651); JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 179-81 (Maurice
Cranston trans., Penguin ed., 1968) (1762)).
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freedom of belief and conscience which are the sole
assurance that religious faith is real, not imposed.23
The separation of Church and State thus seeks to preserve
freedom, both civil and religious. 24 As conceived throughout the
nineteenth century, this freedom was best expressed by James
Madison: "The religion of every man must be left to the
conviction and confidence of every man. In matters of religion no
man's right is to be abridged by the institution of civil society;
religion is wholly exempt from its competence."25 The separation
of Church and State thus sought fundamentally to protect the
religious liberty of each individual.
The ideological separation of civil and religious society,
however, has remained problematic in its realization throughout
the history of our nation, and nowhere more poignantly so than
in the education of our children. Education is the sphere in
which we seek to inculcate the values of our culture whereby the
23 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591-92 (1992). In his concurrence, Justice
Blackmun elaborated on the dual freedoms jeopardized by the entanglement of
government and religion.
The mixing of government and religion can be a threat to free
government, even if no one is forced to participate. When the
government puts its imprimatur on a particular religion, it conveys a
message of exclusion to all those who do not adhere to the favored
beliefs. A government cannot be premised on the belief that all
persons are created equal when it asserts that God prefers some.
Only '[ainguish, hardship and bitter strife' result 'When zealous
religious groups struggl[e] with one another to obtain the
Government's stamp of approval.'
Id. at 606-07 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,
429 (1962)). On the other hand, "[1likewise, we have recognized that '[rieligion
flourishes in greater purity, without than with the aid of Gov[ernment].' "Id. at
608 (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 309 (1952)). "To 'make room for
as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual needs of man deem
necessary,' the government must not align itself with any one of them." Id.
(quoting Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313).
24 Arguing against those scholars who construe the religion clauses as
manifesting an anti-religious stance on the part of the framers who sought only
to protect civil freedoms from religious oppression due to an Enlightened
rationalism, Douglas Laycock correctly observes that: "Of course the
Enlightenment was an important intellectual influence in eighteenth century
America .... But the Great Awakening was an equally important intellectual
influence." Laycock, supra note 7, at 344. The religion clauses thus protect both
civil freedom (from religious oppression) and religious freedom (from civil
oppression). "Religious liberty was the product of an alliance [between the
Evangelicals and the Deists], and neither side in today's culture wars can claim
it as exclusively their own." Id. at 347.
25 Madison, supra note 11.
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culture may preserve itself as such. A core, "self-evident" value
of our American culture is freedom-religious and civil.26 As
Michael McConnell notes: "At the time of the American founding,
churches were the primary institutions for the formation of
democratic character and the transmission and affirmation of
community values."27 This was not generally perceived as
troublesome until the mid-nineteenth century advent of
immigration by large numbers of European Catholics and Jews.28
Stephen Carter contends that the history of public education in
our country exposes the underlying Protestantism endemic to our
cultural ideologies.29
In the nineteenth century, "Roman Catholicism and, to a
lesser extent, Judaism, were widely viewed as threats to
America, which was self-consciously a Protestant country."30
This threat was the motivating factor in the Common School
Movement to create "universal, free, public education", conceived
initially by Horace Mann in the early nineteenth century, but not
gaining cultural momentum until the post Civil War wave of
European immigration.31  "[Tihe Common School movement
26 As quintessentially expressed by Thomas Jefferson: "We hold these
truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed
by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
27 McConnell, supra note 13, at 1253. "During the first century of the
nation's history, such 'public' schools as existed were for all practical purposes
Protestant parochial schools, supported by local communities." Stephen L.
Carter, Religious Freedom as if Religion Matters: A Tribute to Justice Brennan,
87 CAL. L. REV. 1059, 1080 (1999).
28 See generally the following selections for an overview of this period:
STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE DISSENT OF THE GOVERNED: A MEDITATION ON LAW,
RELIGION, AND LOYALTY (1998); CHARLES LESLIE GLENN, JR., THE MYTH OF THE
COMMON SCHOOL (1988); CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON
SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY (1983).
29 Carter, supra note 9, at 1199.
[T]he immigration question has always been central to the question
of state support for parochial schools: the project of denying public
money to religious schools, and the larger project of discouraging
private religious education, were born not of constitutional principle
but of religious bigotry. The common school, which was sold to the
public on expressly religious grounds, simply cannot be understood
except as an effort to Protestantize the immigrant children.
Id.
30 Id. at 1197.
31 Carter, supra note 27, at 1079 (quoting HORACE MANN, THE IMPORTANCE
OF UNIVERSAL, FREE, PUBLIC EDUCATION 151 n.5 (1998)).
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believed that the states should provide common schools that
would educate all children-rich and poor, Protestant and
Catholic, native and immigrant-together, through a common
'nonsectarian' curriculum."32 Although non-sectarian, the
movement was nonetheless religious-in distinctly Protestant
fashion.33  For nineteenth century America, "non-sectarian"
education simply meant religiously informed moral education not
peculiar to any particular Protestant sect, but inculcating a
common patriotic Protestantism. 34 The post Civil War Supreme
Court followed this same cultural lead in 1878 when it effectively
"allowed the country's Protestant majority to use the power of
government to impose its cultural values on a religious
minority."35 Against predictable Catholic and Jewish reaction,
compulsory public education laws were passed in the late
nineteenth century along with tandem legislation forbidding
state funding of "private" (non-Protestant religious) schools,
which had the effect of establishing and funding Protestant
32 McConnell, supra note 13, at 1263.
33 Id. "'[Mioral training, or the application of religious principles to the
duties of life is the 'inseparable accompaniment' to education." Id. (citing
Horace Mann, Ninth Annual Report of the Secretary of the Board 157 (1846),
quoted in CHARLES LESLIE GLENN, JR., THE MYTH OF THE COMMON SCHOOL 165
(1987)). Bible reading (King James Version), prayer, and religious instruction
remained as part of the educational curriculum. Id.
14 See McConnell, supra note 13, at 1263. "Mann explained that the schools
should 'draw the line between those views of religious truth and of Christian
faith which are common to all, and may, therefore, with propriety be inculcated
in school, and those which, being peculiar to individual sects, are therefore by
law excluded."' Id. (citing Horace Mann, Ninth Annual Report of the Secretary
of the Board 157 (1846), quoted in CHARLES GLENN, THE MYTH OF THE COMMON
SCHOOL 165 (1987)); see also CARL F. KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC:
COMMON SCHOOLS AND AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1780-1860 76 (1983) (describing the
"ideology" of the Common School movement as centering on "republicanism,
Protestantism, and capitalism"); Carter, supra note 27, at 1079-80 ("The
movement prevailed not under the banner of equality but under the banner of
nationalism: The children of the immigrants would be 'Americanized,'
supporters wrote, which included, very explicitly, an effort to Americanize-
meaning, Protestantize-their religious beliefs.").
35 Michal R. Belknap, God and the Warren Court: The Quest for "A
Wholesome Neutrality", 9 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 401, 409 (1999) (citing
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878)) (allowing the national
prohibition of the Mormon practice of polygamy, even though part of their
religion). Belknap further contends more generally that "[als it had been
interpreted prior to 1953 ... the First Amendment did little to prevent any sect,
or combination of sects, which commanded a political majority, from utilizing
governmental institutions to promote its values and even its dogma." Id. During
this time in our history, the political majority was dictated by Protestant voices.
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"public" schools. 36
While the nineteenth century separation of Church and
State, bearing a patriotic face, produced a covertly Protestant
regime, it progressed into the next century under the distinctly
non-religious, if not anti-religious, guise of "secular humanism."
Prompted by the religious antagonisms of an increasingly
pluralistic society, 37 American culture became increasingly
secular over the course of the twentieth century.38 Under the
pedagogical guidance of such reformers as John Dewey,39 public
36 Carter, supra note 9, at 1197.
Compulsory education laws were designed in this era with the
unapologetic goal of weaning the immigrant children away from their
parents' religions, to replace faith in a foreign God with faith in
America-Protestantism masquerading as patriotism. Protestant
clergy were quite explicit in their view that the schools were to be a
tool for evangelization; support for public education became a virtual
article of faith. Politicians and school officials agreed.
Id.; see also Carter, supra note 27, at 1081.
Supporters of compulsory education laws in the late nineteenth
century were quite explicit about their goals. From politicians to
schoolteachers (including the head of the fledgling National
Education Association), they argued that it was the task of the
schools to wean immigrant children from their foreign religions; and,
under this banner, compulsory public education triumphed. At the
same time, the nativists suddenly discovered-invented might be a
better word-the principle that prohibits the use of state funds to
support religious education, a mischievous idea that killed federal
legislation that would have benefited the Catholic schools, while
allowing local governments to continue to pay for their Protestant
'public' schools.
Id.
37 See Belknap, supra note 35, at 406 ("[Rleligion was replacing nationality,
language, and culture as America's chief basis of social differentiation.") (citing
RicHAR POLENBERG, ONE NATION DIVISIBLE: CLASS, RACE, AND ETHNICITY IN THE
UNITED STATES SINCE 1938 146-47 (1980) (citing WILL HERBERG, PROTESTANT-
CATHOLIC-JEW (1955))).
38 See generally McConnell, supra note 13, at 1257 (addressing the question
of how American culture underwent "this transformation, from a set of ideas
rooted in Christian theology and congenial to religious institutions to an
ideology hostile to or suspicious of religion, at least in its more common
traditional forms").
39 "John Dewey, for example, contended that the public schools have an
'ethical responsibility' to inculcate social values derived from scientific and
democratic principles and to convert children away from the superstitions of
their families." Michael W. McConnell, "God is Dead and We Have Killed Him!":
Freedom of Religion in the Post-modern Age, 1993 BYU L. REV. 163, 179 (1993)
(quoting JOHN DEWEY, MORAL PRINCIPLES IN EDUCATION 7-10 (1975)); see also
Carter, supra note 9, at 1200 ("John Dewey, the twentieth century's great
apostle of educating for democracy, huffed that parents should not be allowed to
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education followed suit. Constitutional law regarding religious
education reacted accordingly.
II. SECULAR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
The Constitution, as applied to matters religious, protects
the "logic of secular liberty."40
During the first half of the twentieth century, the Supreme
Court became embroiled in the antagonistic religious pluralism of
the times, typically in regard to a religious majority using state
power to suppress the activities of a religious minority (not
uncommonly Jehovah's Witnesses41, but also Lutherans42 and
'inoculate' their children with beliefs that they 'happen to have found
serviceable to themselves.") (citing STEVEN C. ROCKEFELLER, JOHN DEWEY:
RELIGIOUS FAITH AND DEMOCRATIC HUMANIsM 250 (1991)); Laycock, supra note
7, at 328 ("John Dewey and the first Humanist Manifesto presented humanism
as a new religion to supersede traditional religions thought to have become
unconvincing.") (citing JOHN DEWEY, A COMMON FAITH (1934) (proposing a
religion based on faith in the accumulated values of human civilization)).
40 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) (citing B. BAILYN, THE
IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 265 (1967)).
41 See Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953) (holding unconstitutional
a state prohibition on religious services in public parks); Saia v. New York, 334
U.S. 558 (1948) (holding unconstitutional a city prohibition on loudspeakers);
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (holding
unconstitutional a mandate that children in public schools salute the American
flag); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (holding unconstitutional a
state tax on Witness literature); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
(1943) (holding unconstitutional a city prohibition on door-to-door Witness
solicitations); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (overturning the
conviction of a Witness for breach of the peace in a Catholic neighborhood for
disseminating anti-Catholic propaganda); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444
(1938) (holding unconstitutional an ordinance providing excessive discretion to
city officials regarding religious solicitation); but see Poulos v. New Hampshire,
345 U.S. 395 (1953) (holding constitutional the application of a
nondiscriminatory licensing requirement to persons conducting religious
services in a public park); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949) (permitting city
restrictions on the volume of loudspeakers); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S.
158 (1944) (upholding the application of child labor laws against Witnesses who
had their children distribute religious literature); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942) (affirming conviction of a Witness who had
cursed a police officer, holding that his "fighting words" were not protected as
free speech); Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (holding that
the Free Exercise Clause did not allow Witness students to refuse to salute the
flag).
42 See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (holding unconstitutional a
state law forbidding primary instruction in a foreign language, thus
overturning the conviction of a Lutheran parochial school teacher for
conducting readings in German).
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Catholics43). As Michal Belknap notes, "[d]uring the quarter
century after 1920, the Supreme Court had extended somewhat
greater constitutional protection to disfavored religious
minorities."44 The Court did not generally adjudicate these cases
under the religion clauses, however, but chose rather to employ
substantive due process,45  freedom of speech, 46  or the
fundamentality of parental rights.47 When it finally did address
itself to the religion clauses, the Court assumed two distinct
postures: "neutrality" under the establishment clause, and
"accommodation" under the free exercise clause.48
The first establishment clause decision came in 1947, when
the Court erected a "wall of separation between church and
state,"49 which wall became "high and impregnable" a year
later.50 This separation principle of governmental neutrality in
religious matters was first applied to impugn the
constitutionality of prayer in public school in 1962,51 when the
Court stated that "[tihe First Amendment was added to the
Constitution to stand as a guarantee [sic] that neither the power
43 See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters of Holy Names, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding
unconstitutional a state requirement that children attend public schools).
4Belknap, supra note 35, at 409.
45 E.g., Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390 (1923).
46 E.g., W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
47 E.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
48 Although the Court does not quite so neatly distinguish its reasoning
under the religion clauses in this systematic way, "neutrality" is most properly
understood as an anti-establishment concept (as long as it does not unduly
impinge upon the free exercise of religion), and "accommodation" is best
understood as a free exercise concept (as long as it does not unduly impose an
establishment of religion). For a compelling history of the Supreme Court's
religion cases in the Warren Court era, see Belknap, supra note 35; Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U. S. 577, 599-609 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
49 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (allowing reimbursement
for the costs of transporting children to private, even parochial schools, stating
that "[nleither a state nor the Federal Government... can pass laws which aid
one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.").
50 McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212 (1948) (holding
impermissible the practice of allowing religious teachers to enter the public
schools during regular school hours to provide religious instruction to students
who wanted such instruction).
51 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (holding unconstitutional the New
York school district's policy of requiring a prayer reading in class every day,
despite the prayer being denominationally neutral and student observance
being voluntary).
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nor the prestige of the Federal Government would be used to
control, support or influence the kinds of prayers American
people can say. . *"52 A year later, the Court similarly
invalidated bible-reading in the public schools,53 stating that
neutrality
thus stems from a recognition ... that powerful sects or
groups might bring about a fusion of governmental and
religious functions ... to the end that official support of the
State or Federal Government would be placed behind the
tenets of one or of all orthodoxies.5 4
The Court re-iterated its neutrality stance on religious activities
in public school in 1968, submitting that the government "may
not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against
another or even against the militant opposite."55 In 1971, the
Court provided itself with a three pronged neutrality test,56
which, except for one instance,57 it used in each of the thirty one
establishment clause cases decided over the next twenty years,
dictating essentially that the government must be guided by
secular aims, neither promote nor prohibit religion, and therefore
not entangle itself with religion.58 In 1992, the Court addressed
prayer at school graduation ceremonies,5 9 holding that although
52 Id. at 429.
53 Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)
(holding that because the schools' opening exercises were government-sponsored
religious ceremonies involving prayer and readings from the Bible, the primary
effect was the advancement of religion and therefore violated the Establishment
Clause).
54 Id. at 222.
55 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (holding unconstitutional
an Arkansas law preventing the teaching of evolution).
56 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (holding that for a
statute to survive an Establishment Clause challenge: "[fiirst, the statute must
have a secular legislative purpose; second, its principal or primary effect must
be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion ... [and] finally, the statute
must not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion"')
(citations omitted).
57 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (holding that the practice of
commencing legislative sessions with a prayer led by a chaplain appointed by
the legislature does not violate the Establishment Clause because the Founding
Fathers followed the same practice, even during the session when the Bill of
Rights was enacted)
58 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 602 (1992) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
59 Id. at 599 (1992) (holding unconstitutional a Rhode Island school
district's policy of inviting members of the clergy to offer invocation/benediction
prayers as part of the formal graduation ceremonies for middle and high
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"[a] relentless and all-pervasive attempt to exclude religion from
every aspect of public life could itself become inconsistent with
the Constitution,"60 such prayers would unduly "persuade or
compel a student to participate in a religious exercise"61 and thus
violate "[tihe First Amendment's Religion Clauses [which dictate]
that religious beliefs and religious expression are too precious to
be either proscribed or prescribed by the State."62 Most recently,
the Court similarly frowned upon student-initiated prayer at
school sporting events, 63 averring that it "has the improper effect
of coercing those present to participate in an act of religious
worship."64 Under the establishment clause, the Court has thus
consistently invalidated religious activity sponsored in, through,
or by the public schools, holding finally that "the 'preservation
and transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a
responsibility and a choice committed to the private sphere.' "65
Under the establishment clause, the Court thus structured a
constitutional dichotomy between the pubic and the private, the
former domain to be governed by secular interests and the latter
permitted to be governed by religious interests, to prevent
private religious interests from exerting public coercion upon the
privacy of others.
Perhaps in response to acrimonious public outcry against the
ostensibly anti-religious establishment clause decisions of the
Court in the late forties,66 the first accommodationist decision
under the free exercise clause was issued in 1952,67 stating that
"[wie are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a
Supreme Being,"68 and further emphasizing that the Constitution
schools).
60 Id. at 598.
61 Id. at 599.
62 Id. at 589.
63 Sante Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 315-16 (2000) (holding a
Texas school district's policy of permitting student-led, student-initiated prayer
prior to high school football games violated the establishment clause).
64 Id. at 312.
65 Id. at 310 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992).
66 Belknap, supra note 35, at 412 (1999) (citing MELVIN I. UROFSKY,
DIVISION AND DISCORD: THE SUPREME COURT UNDER STONE AND VINSON, 1941-
1953 236-37 (1997)).
67 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952) (upholding a New York City plan
that allowed students to leave school grounds during the school day to pursue
religious activities at religious centers).
68 Id. at 313.
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requires neither "a callous indifference to religious groups [nor] .
. . [flor government to be hostile to religion."69 Absent intrusion
upon a compelling state interest, the government must
constitutionally accommodate religion and not ban its free
exercise, either expressly or effectively.70 The subsequent history
of the Court's accommodationist application of the free exercise
clause, however, failed to manifest a favorable disposition toward
religious groups seeking exemption from laws ranging from
Sunday Blue Laws,71 prohibition of wearing of a yarmulke while
in military uniform,72 requirement of obtaining a social security
number for a child in contravention to religious conviction,7 3 U.S.
Forest Service permits to timber lands and construct roadways in
an area of national forest traditionally used for religious
purposes,7 4 to state unemployment benefits construing as
"misconduct" the religious use of peyote,75 the latter decision
stating that "if prohibiting the exercise of religion.., is ...
merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and
otherwise valid provision," the free exercise clause has not been
violated.7 6 Although the Congress sought to re-install a rigorous
accommodationist stance with the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act of 1993, 77 the Court struck it down as unconstitutional four
years later as exceeding Congress' enforcement powers under the
69 Id. at 314.
70o See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 727 (1986) (O'Connor, J., concurring and
dissenting) ("[Tihe Government must accommodate a legitimate free exercise
claim unless pursuing an especially important interest by narrowly tailored
means."); accord Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (stating
that Government "would be 'prohibiting the free exercise [of religion]' if it
sought to ban [acts or refusals to act] only when they are engaged in for
religious reasons, or only because of the religious belief that they display.").
71 See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961) (holding that state laws
restricting activities on Sunday are no longer religiously motivated); Two Guys
from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961) (same);
Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961) (same).
72 See Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986).
73 See Bowen, 476 U.S. at 708.
74 See Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439
(1988).
75 See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990).
76 Id. at 878.
77 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1 (1994) ("Government shall not substantially burden
a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general
applicability, [unless] ... it demonstrates that application of the burden to the
person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the
least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.").
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Fourteenth Amendment. 7s As Michael McConnell observes, "free
exercise cases were almost always losers: virtually any plausible
public purpose was deemed sufficient to override the right of
religious exercise."79 This is hardly surprising inasmuch as
under the Court's establishment clause jurisprudence, compelling
state interests are inevitably secular interests-interests seldom
consonant with religious interests.80 Under the free exercise
clause, the Court will thus accommodate private religious
interests, but which private religious interests are almost
invariably trumped by competing public secular interests.
On the one hand, then, the establishment clause principle of
neutrality prevents governmental discrimination in favor of
religion; on the other hand, the free exercise clause principle of
accommodation prevents governmental discrimination against
religion.81 The neutrality principle is driven by a constitutional
anxiety against placing governmental authority behind any
particular religious orthodoxy or religion in general;2 the
accommodation principle is driven by a constitutional tolerance
for any particular religious practice or religion in general as long
as it does not intrude upon an important governmental interest.8 3
78 See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
79 McConnell, supra note 39, at 176.
80 Stephen Carter rightly observes that "the immediate difficulty for the
accommodationist is that it is the state that is doing the accommodating."
Carter, supra note 27, at 1070. Carter therefore identifies two fundamental
problems with the Court's jurisprudence of accommodation. "First, the
accommodationist must define religion, which already narrows the universe of
what counts." Id.
Second, the accommodationist must indicate a limit beyond which no
claim of religious freedom will be recognized-to resolve, for example,
the problem of religiously mandated murder. Most
accommodationists, along with the now-unconstitutional RFRA, place
the limit at 'compelling state interest;' but even setting
compellingness as the standard, and handling it correctly, the courts
in the end will be centering their concern on the needs of the state,
not the needs of the religionist.
Id. at 1071.
81 See Michael J. Perry, Freedom of Religion in the United States: Fin De
Siecle Sketches, 75 IND. L.J. 295, 308 (2000) ("Whereas the free exercise norm
forbids government to discriminate against religion, the nonestablishment norm
forbids government to discriminate in favor of religion.").
82 Id. "[Glovernment may not take any action based on the view that the
preferred religion or religions are better along one or another dimension of
value than one or more other religions or than no religion at all." Id.
83 Id. at 298. "[The freedom of religious exercise] is... the freedom to
practice-to 'put into practice'-one's religion (religious beliefs) to the extent
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Although complementary in design, these two principles collide
when religious neutrality itself comprises the governmental
interest to be protected against the accommodation of religion.
Invariably, this collision is in the name of secularity-the
governing principle of the twentieth century separation of church
and state.
The Court's twin posturing of neutrality and accommodation
under the establishment and free exercise clauses respectively
presumes a common secular stance toward religion. The
Constitution protects the free exercise of religion as a
fundamental right, but such protection may not work on an
establishment of religion. The twentieth century jurisprudence
of the Supreme Court construes this to mean at best that religion
is an entirely private affair that must not be allowed to impose
itself upon the public domain,s4 and at worst that religion is a
suspect activity that must not be permitted to subvert the civic
order.85 In either case, religion has effectively been marginalized
doing so does not damage any interest government may legitimately protect,
such as human life." Id. at 298. Perry further cautions, however, that
"[g]overnment may not discriminate against religion in the guise of protecting
an interest it may legitimately protect," which is to say that the protected
governmental interest may not legitimately be used as a pretext for curtailing a
disfavored religious exercise. Id. at 299. "[I]f government wants to ban conduct
that is a religious practice for some who engage in it, the free exercise norm
requires that government do so for some reason other than diminished respect
and concern for, much less outright hostility to, the religious group for whom
the conduct is a religious practice." Id. at 301.
84 See, e.g., Sante Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 310 (2000)
("[Tihe 'preservation and transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a
responsibility and a choice committed to the private sphere."') (quoting Lee v.
Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589 (1992)); id. at 592 (It is the State's "duty to guard
and respect that sphere of inviolable conscience and belief which is the mark of
a free people."); id. at 608-09 (Blackmun, J., concurring) ("Keeping religion in
the hands of private groups minimizes state intrusion on religious choice and
best enables each religion to 'flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and
the appeal of its dogma.') (quoting Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952));
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 610-11 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring)
("[Rieligious beliefs worthy of respect are the product of free and voluntary
choice by the faithful.") (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 53-54 (1985));
Lee, 505 U.S. at 645 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("Church and state would not be
such a difficult subject if religion were, as the Court apparently thinks it to be,
some purely personal avocation that can be indulged entirely in secret, like
pornography, in the privacy of one's room."); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602,
625 (1971) (Religion is "a private matter for the individual, the family, and the
institutions of private choice.").
85 See, e.g., Lee, 505 U.S. at 607 (Blackmun, J., concurring)
When the government arrogates to itself a role in religious affairs, it
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by the Court so as not unduly to impinge upon an otherwise
secular society, "ensuring that religious belief is irrelevant to
every citizen's standing in the political community."6 The
Constitution is thus construed fundamentally to protect the
"'logic of secular liberty' "87---a logic that would elide religious
influences from the culture at large as something that should
only be indulged privately.88
This judicial stance toward religion is consistent, of course,
with how the American culture has come to regard religion-at
least, the American culture as defined by those who are
professionally interested in regarding such matters. Michael
McConnell provides a brief survey of the secularist attitude
toward religion, ranging from indifference to hostility, exhibited
by representatives of the legal,89 academic,90 and pedagogic91
abandons its obligation as guarantor of democracy. Democracy
requires the nourishment of dialog and dissent, while religious faith
puts its trust in an ultimate divine authority above all human
deliberation. When the government appropriates religious truth, it
'transforms rational debate into theological decree.'
Id. (citations omitted); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622.
Ordinary political debate and division, however vigorous or even
partisan, are normal and healthy manifestations of our democratic
system of government, but political division along religious lines was
one of the principal evils against which the First Amendment was
intended to protect. The potential divisiveness of such conflict is a
threat to the normal political process.
Id. (citations omitted); Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 241-42 (1963) (Brennan, J., concurring).
It is implicit in the history and character of American public
education that the public schools serve a uniquely public function:
the training of American citizens in an atmosphere free of parochial,
divisive, or separatist influences of any sort-an atmosphere in which
children may assimilate a heritage common to all American groups
and religions. This is a heritage neither theistic nor atheistic, but
simply civic and patriotic.
Id. (citations omitted).
86 Lee, 505 U.S. at 627 (Souter, J., concurring)
87 County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 612 (1989) (Blackmun, J.)
(quoting Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982)); see McConnell, supra note
39, at 174 ("With such a change in perspective, freedom of religion came to be
seen as less important than freedom from religion.").
88 See McConnell, supra note 39, at 165 (Under the Supreme Court's
rulings, "[r]eligion in public is at best a breach of etiquette, at worst a violation
of the law. Religion is privatized and marginalized. It has nothing to offer to the
public sphere.").
89 "Today, it is not unusual to find law professors writing that religions
'undermine rather than mutually reinforce habits of mind necessary for
democratic decision-making,' or that religion is 'fundamentally incompatible
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culture, all of whom are disposed to remove religion from the
political, legal and educational arena as an improper justification
for social agenda. "More commonly, the principle of secular
justification is expressed as an 'informal constraint' that 'religion
and religious conviction are purely private matters that have no
role or place in the nation's political process.' "92 Even Michael
Perry, an otherwise astute advocate of the continuing viability of
religious insight, cautions against the use of religious argument
absent independent secular justification.93
with the intellectual cornerstone of the modern democratic state."' McConnell,
supra note 39, at 173 (quoting, respectively, Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the
Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discriminatory Accommodation of
Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 598 (1991); Steven G. Gey, Why Is Religion
Special?: Reconsidering the Accommodation of Religion Under the Religion
Clauses of the First Amendment, 52 U. PITT. L. REV. 75, 174 (1990)).
Bruce Ackerman argues that a goal of 'liberal education' is 'to provide
the child with cultural materials' in her resistance to parental values
so that she 'may forge the beginnings of an identity that deviates
from parental norms' [so as to provide a] 'neutral' way to build liberal
citizens who will think for themselves.
McConnell, supra note 39, at 173-744, 749. (quoting BRUCE A. ACKERMAN,
SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 153 (1980).
90 "Influential voices in our culture have propagated the idea that
democratic deliberation must be confined to secular arguments and
justifications-arguments and justifications that do not depend on the existence
of God or on divine commands, on theological considerations, including the
interpretations of sacred texts, or on the pronouncements of religious
authorities." McConnell, supra note 8, at 641 (citing Robert Audi, The
Separation of Church and State and the Obligations of Citizenship, 18 PHIL. &
PUB. AFF. 259, 278 (1989) (calling this the "principle of secular rationale")).
"Richard Rorty calls it 'bad taste to bring religion into discussions of public
policy." McConnell, supra note 8, at 642 (quoting Richard Rorty, Religion as
Conversation-Stopper, 3 COMMON KNOWLEDGE 1, 2 (1994)).
91 Michael W. McConnell notes:
Studies by the National Institute for Education, People for the
American Way, Americans United for Separation Between Church
and State, and the Association for Supervision and Curriculum
Development have been surprisingly uniform in their finding that
religion has been systematically excluded from the public school
curriculum, including such subjects as history, social studies, and
humanities, where it unquestionably plays a part.
McConnell, supra note 39, at 180.
92 McConnell, supra note 8, at 641 (quoting William P. Marshall, The Other
Side of Religion, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 844 (1993)).
93 Michael J. Perry explains:
[I]n making a political choice about the morality of human conduct,
legislators and other policymakers and even ordinary citizens should
forgo reliance on a religious argument about human well-being-at
least, they should be exceedingly wary about relying on such a
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The separation maintained by the Supreme Court over the
course of the twentieth century is thus a separation sustained by
a distinctly secular concern to excise religion as a purely private
matter from the public domain-especially the public school
domain-lest religious influences unduly intrude upon the
governmental interest in religious neutrality.94 Whereas the
nineteenth century separation of Church and State sought
fundamentally to protect religious liberty-the liberty of each
individual to freely exercise religion uncoerced through state
endorsement, the twentieth century separation of Church and
State has sought fundamentally to protect secular liberty-the
liberty of each individual to be free from religious influence.
Initially construed to guarantee a freedom for religion, the
Constitution has become construed to guarantee a freedom from
religion. Although profoundly distinct from the separation of
Church and State in the nineteenth century, the twentieth
century separation nonetheless manifests the same logic of
privatizing religion and accordingly valorizing covertly a
publically viable religious posture. In the nineteenth century,
the privatization of religion expressed a non-sectarian Protestant
religiosity, which religiosity therefore became constituted
covertly as the accepted public form of religion, and was
constitutionally protected as such. Over the course of the
twentieth century, in the face of an increasingly antagonistic
religious pluralism, a consequently exacerbated privatization of
religion expressed a religiously neutral secularism, which
secularism has become constituted covertly as the accepted
public posture in matters religious, and remains constitutionally
protected as such. Public education has thus become secular
education-"in which children may assimilate a heritage...
neither theistic nor atheistic, but simply civic and patriotic."95
religious argument-unless an independent secular argument that
they themselves accept, that they themselves find persuasive, reaches
the same conclusion about the requirements of human well-being as
the religious argument.
Michael J. Perry, Liberal Democracy and Religious Morality, 48 DEPAUL L. REV.
1, 20 (1998) (emphasis in original).
94 See McConnell, supra note 39, at 181 ("A secular school does not
necessarily produce atheists, but it produces young adults who inevitably think
of religion as extraneous to the real world of intellectual inquiry, if they think of
religion at all.").
95 Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 242 (1963)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted). As Michael W. McConnell stated:
40 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 4
Religious freedom has become "freedom from conformity to
religious dogma,"96 and secularity is held forth as the only viable
justificatory social posture-reflecting, in some strong sense, "the
establishment of a religion of secularism" 97 that "bristles with
hostility to all things religious in public life."98
At the end of the twentieth century, the central
jurisprudential issue surrounding the religion clauses is whether
the Court's posture of secular neutrality itself comprises a
religious stance-reflecting, perhaps, the central religious issue
confronting our culture.99 Michael McConnell insists that "[i]t is
essential to recognize that secularism is not a neutral stance. It
More recently, twentieth century educational reformers have
pursued the same 'Americanizing' project in a more secular hue, no
less offensive to traditionalist Catholics, Protestants, and Jews but
lacking the overt connection to liberal Protestantism. Now, the
emphasis is more likely to be on egalitarianism, environmentalism,
self-esteem, and other products of modern secular liberal thought. It
is not evident, however, that education has become any less one-
sided-any less sectarianism-than it used to be. The dominant
ideology has changed, but the use of the schools to inculcate that
dominant ideology is essentially the same.
McConnell, supra note 13, at 1264. Stephen L. Carter also stated:
Viewed in historical perspective, then, our war over epistemology
continues to display all the characteristics that made it so bitter a
century ago. The group in power believes that the purpose of schools
is to persuade the children of the other side that the other side is
wrong. The purpose is clothed in the gentle language of preparing
young people to be adult citizens of the republic, but the clothing
should not distract us from the argument underneath: good adults
are, by definition, those who think the way the dominant group does,
and this truth is the same whether the dominant group is nativist
Protestants in the nineteenth century, progressive intellectuals at
the beginning of the twentieth, anti-Communist populists in the
middle of this century, or theorists of liberalism today.... [T]he
effort to make sure that all children are educated in the same way is
just as totalitarian now as it was in the nineteenth century when
Protestant nativists were doing it.
Carter, supra note 9, at 1223-24.
96 W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 653 (1943) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
97 Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 313 (1963)
(Stewart, J. dissenting).
98 Sante Fe Independent Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 318 (2000)
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
99 "The most fundamental religious conflict in the United States today is
between those who have abandoned theistic belief or accommodated their
theism to contemporary secular values, and those who have not." Laycock,
supra note 7, at 327.
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is a partisan stance, no less 'sectarian,' in its way, than
religion."100 To the question of what religion constitutionally
means, Douglas Laycock responds that "[tio avoid incoherence
the answer must be that 'religion' is any set of answers to
religious questions, including the negative and skeptical answers
of atheists, agnostics, and secularists."101 Stephen Carter
observes that if "the inclusion of a prayer in the curriculum is an
endorsement of religiosity, then the absence of one might well...
serve as an endorsement of irreligiosity. That the state may do
the second and not the first is, at best, a tortured reading of the
First Amendment."02 Michael Perry contends in similar manner
that "tihere is no... relevant difference-no difference
relevant.., to legitimate public policy concerns... -between
acts of conscience self-understood in... religious terms and...
acts [of conscience] self-understood in [nonreligious] terms."103
Although Constitutional scholars thus evince widespread
dissatisfaction with the freedom of religion jurisprudence of the
Supreme Court (as having covertly valorized a quasi-religious
secularism in the twentieth century in the same way it covertly
valorized non-sectarian Protestantism in the nineteenth), it
remains unclear how the Court can constitutionally right itself
on matters religious.
III. THE LAW OF RELIGION
"We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are
created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with
certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty
and the pursuit of Happiness."104
For over two centuries, our nation has sought
constitutionally to negotiate a peaceful relationship between civic
and religious obligation; for over fifty years, our highest court for
the adjudication of constitutional disputes has repeatedly
addressed itself to the perennial flashpoint of this relationship-
the inculcation of civic and religious values in our children.
These disputes have turned on whether the governmental regard
100 McConnell, supra note 13, at 1264.
101 Laycock, supra note 7, at 326.
102 Carter, supra note 9, at 1213.
103 Perry, supra note 81, at 315.
104 DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
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for public religious activity unconstitutionally proscribes or
prescribes religion. Although such disputes remain legally
viable-and hotly contested-within the history of the Supreme
Court's jurisprudence on the religion clauses, they fail to grapple
with the more fundamental issue of the relationship between law
and religion in a self-avowedly secular culture, and thus fail to
address the underlying conceptions of law and religion that
inform-if not obfuscate-these disputes.'0 5 The Court may well
be disinclined to speak on such matters-Justice Souter quipped
that "I can hardly imagine a subject [comparative theology] less
amenable to the competence of the federal judiciary, or more
deliberately to be avoided where possible."106 Nonetheless, to
remain self-evident, truths must be properly held, and to remain
unalienable, endowments must be properly pursued.
The concept of the secular was originally a religious concept,
referring to the transfer of ecclesiastical property to non-
ecclesiastical use.107 Over the course of our nations's history,
nearly all aspects of public life have undergone this transfer-
become "secularized," such that the entire civic order no longer
construes itself as informed religiously. 108 The religious order
has consequently devolved into an entirely private affair, the
social utility of which-at best-is to provide personal
justification for moral behavior.109 At the heart of the secular
105 David Novak, Law: Religious or Secular?, 86 VA. L. REV. 569, 571-74
(2000) (arguing that the constitutional issues concerning the practice of
religious rituals in public do not adequately deal with the more fundamental
question of the legitimization of secular polity, and querying whether secular
legitimization would presuppose atheism on the one hand, or whether religious
legitimization would require conversion on the other).
106 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 616-17 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring).
107 HANS KUNG, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN 26 (Edward Quinn trans., Doubleday
& Co., 1976); see also Albert Keller, Secularization, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THEOLOGY: THE CONCISE SACRAMENTUM MUNDI 1554 (Karl Rahner ed., 1975).
l08 KUNG, supra note 107, at 26-27.
But today it seems that not only certain items of ecclesiastical
property, but more or less all the important spheres of human life-
learning, economy, politics, law, state, culture, education, medicine,
social welfare-have been withdrawn from the influence of the
Churches, of theology and religion, and placed under the direct
responsibility and control of man, who has himself thus become
'secular.'
Id.
109 See DAVID TRACY, BLESSED RAGE FOR ORDER 101 (1975) ("For the
conventional wisdom in the secularist culture at large, it seems fair to observe,
religion is widely considered a reasonably useful if somewhat primitive way of
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order, however, and underlying its moral foundation, resides an
assumption regarding the dignity intrinsic to human being as
autonomously free from extrinsic authority, particularly religious
authority.
The governing moral assumption of our nation's civic order is
equality: that all human beings, by virtue only of being human,
possess an inherent value that prevents their moral
differentiation on the basis of any socially defining characteristic,
whether religious, political, economic, racial, ethnic, sexual,
etc. 10 Such social differentiations are extrinsic to the essential
nature of human beings. In essence, all human beings are equal
by virtue of nothing-i.e., not by virtue of any some-thing in
terms of which individuals may be socially differentiated. " This
equality is defined in our legal culture in terms of the universal
being moral."). Of course, much philosophical effort over the past several
centuries of Western European intellectual history has been devoted to
abstracting the moral value of religious traditions out of their shadowy religious
caricature and into the light of reason. Within this intellectual tradition,
however, religious belief has remained an acceptable, albeit obtuse and
therefore somewhat volatile moral scheme for those unsuited to such reflective
enlightenment. Theology-academically disciplined religious thought-remains
of value in this enlightened culture only if it ultimately serves the secular end of
construing religious traditions accordingly. See LANGDON GILKEY, NAMING THE
WHIRLWIND: THE RENEWAL OF GOD-LANGUAGE 250 (1969) (arguing that
secularity "sets one unalterable requirement for any relevant theological
language, namely that whatever religious faith or theological expression we
advance must be related to this worldly life, evident within it, and creative for
it.")
110 See Matthew A. Ritter, Human Rights: The Universalist Controversy, 30
CAL. W. IN'L L.J. 71, 77-80 (1999); see also William E. Nelson, The Changing
Meaning of Equality in Twentieth-Century Constitutional Law, 52 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 3, 4 (1995) ("Equality has been the central issue of American
constitutional law in the twentieth century .... ).
111 Much ink has been spilled over the course of the past two centuries,
particularly in American Jurisprudence, on trying rationally to determine
how-in terms of what aspect of humanity-humans are equal. This effort,
however, has been for naught, because it misunderstands the conceptual
grammar of the Western notion of human equality. If there were anything in
terms of which all humans were equal, then that very thing would become a
means to differentiate one individual from another, providing a measure
whereby one person may become "more equal" than another, hence not equal. In
the West, humans are simply not equal by virtue of any socially defining
characteristic, whether that be construed as having some religious, racial,
ethnic, or 15olitical identity, possessing land, riches, beauty, or intelligence, or
even sporting a penis. Humans are equal in terms of nothing. Our notion of
equality demands this by conceptual necessity-but not by mere philosophical
fiat; rather, this notion of equality devolves from a distinctive religious heritage.
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possession of "rights" by all individuals-rights that articulate a
singularly secular appreciation for the essential humanity
universally intrinsic to all human beings and providing the
programmatic basis for the claim of equality between them,
regardless of social differentia, especially religious.112 This
engenders an equally secular understanding of the human being:
the abstract autonomous individual: rational, independent, self-
sufficient, unencumbered and unconnected to others except by
choice.113 Our nation's laws function ultimately to protect and
promote the rights of the abstract autonomous individual, and
thus exhibit a heightened regard for privacy.1 4
112 See Matthew A. Ritter, 'Human Rights". Would You Recognize One if
You Saw One? A Philosophical Hearing of International Rights Talk, 27 CAL.
W. INT'L L.J. 265, 273 (1997) ("Modern jurisprudence [of human rights] was
initiated upon a programmatically non-religious basis. Rights talk would base
itself not upon the extrinsically revealed truth of the divine, but upon the
intrinsically known truth of the human.").
113 See Matthew A. Ritter, Universal Rights Talk / Plurality of Voices: A
Philosophical-Theological Hearing, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND RELIGION 417,
428 (Mark W. Janis & Carolyn Evans eds., 1999).
The essential being of human being is thus constituted as the pre-
communal autonomy of the abstract individual. How this essential
being is communally realized is a function of preserving its defining
character of autonomy. The abstract individual becomes itself
precisely by virtue of being itself, namely autonomous. The central
and controlling issue for the abstract autonomous individual thus
becomes: how to protect and promote one's autonomy. For modernity,
autonomy is preserved through two fundamental complementary
rights: the right to privacy, and the right to self-development. The
right to privacy dictates that the autonomy of the abstract individual
is to be respected by the various communal involvements of the
individual. Privacy generates a host of protective rights. The right to
self-development dictates that the abstract individual be allowed
autonomously to pursue whatever mode of self-realization the
individual should choose. Self-development generates a host of
promotive rights. The complementary rights of privacy/self-
development programmatically inform all communal involvements of
the abstract autonomous individual: political, economic, legal,
religious, and even philosophical.
Id. (citations omitted); see also MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK 48 (1991).
114 KUNG, supra note 107, at 532. According to Kung, a cultural system
constitutionally based on tolerance and freedom of conscious, thought, and
religion is "built on the imperishable dignity and freedom of man as man and
seeks to guarantee the human rights or democratic liberties involved in being a
man." Id.
These provisions however should not be ends in themselves, but only
the institutional conditions for each man to claim his wholly personal
freedom, free from compulsion by state or party, to aim at a suitable
goal, at a life worth living, at values, norms and ideals, to pursue his
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Historically, the justification for proclaiming a dignity
equally inherent in every human being has been distinctly
religious in nature. The theological claim of equality rests upon
the proclaimed sanctity of all human life.115 Sanctity is a
function of divine sanction. The contemporary jurisprudence of
equality, however, assiduously avoids religious justifications. 116
"We almost all accept... that human life in all its forms is
sacred .... For some of us, this is a matter of religious faith; for
others, of secular but deep philosophical belief."n7  Several
reasons contribute to the secular disaffection for a theological
jurisprudence.
In the first place, various religions address themselves quite
differently (if at all) to the value of being human."l 8 Because no
religious criteria exist to adjudicate these differences, secular
distress arises over the perceived religious pluralism. Each
religion claims the categorical truth of its claims, as well the sole
means for the recognition of their truth. Such truth claims are
therefore religiously particular. The moral principle of equality
is construed as universal. Because the universal may not
properly be based upon the particular, universal regard for the
dignity equally inherent in every individual human being can
scarcely be justified by appeal to any particular religious
perspective. 119 Moreover, religion is not only understood as
self-realization and complete humanization.
Id.
115 See MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE ROLE OF RELIGION AND
MORALITY IN AMERICAN POLITICS 75-82 (1991).
116 See ROLANDO GAETE, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE LIMITS OF CRITICAL REASON
123 (1993).
117 Ronald Dworkin, Life is Sacred. That's the Easy Part, N.Y. TIMES, May
16, 1993, at 36; see also Perry, supra note 92, at 22 (quoting JAMES GRIFFIN,
WELL-BEING: ITS MEANING, MEASUREMENT, AND MORAL IMPORTANCE 239 (1986)
("[Tihe proposition that every human being is sacred is axiomatic for so many
secular moralities that many secular moral philosophers have come to speak of
'the moral point of view' as that view according to which 'every person [has]
some sort of equal status.").
118 See generally Ritter, supra note 110 (discussing the conceptual
dissonance of the absolute and universal dignity attributed to human being
under the Western notion of human rights with African, Islamic, Hindu,
Confucian, Buddhist, Jewish, and Christian religiosity).
119 Yong Huang, Political Solidarity and Religious Plurality: A Rortian
Alternative to Liberalism and Communitarianism, 11 J.L. & RELIGION 499, 501
(1994-95).
Political liberals are not essentially against religious plurality.
Indeed, the very reason that some of them try to find a political
40 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 4
unhelpful for the determination of universal standards, it is
generally perceived as historically antagonistic to their
implementation. Religious conflict has perhaps contributed more
to violation of human rights than to their universalization.
Religion "is clearly seen by most analysts to be a part of the
problem rather than the solution."120 Finally, the justification for
civic morality has not historically been theologically disposed, but
has rather been programmatically non-religious.' 21
The jurisprudence of civic morality would base itself not
upon the extrinsically revealed truth of the divine, but upon the
intrinsically known truth of the human.122  "Modern
Enlightenment intellectuals, in their attempt to secularize the
religious culture, were confident about their picture of a liberal
society because they believed that this picture corresponds, at
least better than the religious one does, to intrinsic human
rationality that transcends the diverse religious doctrines is to assure
that we have such a plurality. However, when a religious belief
conflicts with political rationality, they insist that the former must be
regarded as unreasonable, irrational, and mad. For political
rationality is impersonal, impartial, and universal, while all religious
beliefs are personal, partial, and particular.
Id.
120 Douglas M. Johnston, Religion and Conflict Resolution, 20 FLETCHER F.
WORLD AFF. 53, 53 (1996).
121 John Witte, Jr., Law, Religion, and Human Rights, 28 COLUM. HUM.
RTS. L. REV. 1, 29-30 (1996).
Conventional accounts of law, human rights, and democracy afford
little space to religious ideas and institutions. Laws are generally
viewed as rules and statutes promulgated by the sovereign, not as
temporal elaborations of a divine or natural law. Human rights
norms are generally viewed as secular claims to a good life, not as
corollaries to divine duties for right living. Political rulers are
generally viewed as representatives of public opinion and vindicators
of human rights, not as vice-regents of God or champions of divine
justice. To be sure, most writers today would agree that religious
believers must be guaranteed liberty of conscience and free exercise
of religion and that religious institutions must be guaranteed
collective worship and corporate organization. But religion, according
to conventional accounts, is fundamentally a private matter with
little constructive role to play in the drama of law, human rights, and
democracy.
Id.; see also GAETE, supra note 116, at 106.
122 "Human rights are not given to man by God...." Jack Donnelly,
Human Rights, Individual Rights and Collective Rights, in HuMAN RIGHTS IN A
PLURALISTIC WORLD 39, 42 (Jan Berting et al. eds., 1990).
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dignity (or human rights or human nature)."1 23  Toward
establishing justification for its civic morality, then, a secular
jurisprudence eschews any particular religious revelation of
being human in favor of its intrinsic universal rationality.124
Jurisprudence has consequently employed one of two
strategies to establish a rational basis for the egalitarian regard
properly granted all individuals: a "definitional strategy"125 and a
ccself-regarding strategy."1 26  The definitional strategy dictates
that having equal regard for others is what morality means. The
definitional strategy is itself definitionally unable to provide a
reason for being moral beyond a mere categorical imperative.
127
What is categorically imperative for one, however, is arbitrarily
dogmatic to another. 28 It amounts to a rational justification for
neither. The self-regarding strategy provides that one's self-
interest is best advanced through advancing the interests of
others. Having regard for others is thus motivated by regard for
self. Regard for self is prudently achieved by exercising regard
for others. At best, the self-regarding strategy generates a
123 Huang, supra note 119, at 501.
124 See Willem F. Heinemeijer, Islam and the Ideals of the Enlightenment,
in HUMAN RIGHTS IN A PLURALISTIC WORLD 145, 146 (Jan Berting et al. eds.,
1990). "Out of respect for the truth the humanist asks for the credentials of the
revealed Truth." Id
125 Michael J. Perry, Is the Idea of Human Rights Ineliminably Religious?,
27 U. RICH. L. REV. 1023, 1063 (1993); MICHAEL J. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER 36-
37 (1991).
126 Id. at 1068-69.
127 Dworkin contends, for example, that equality is a fundamental postulate
of political morality. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 272 (Harvard
Univ. Press 1978). As such, it requires no justification, but is rather self-
justifying. The recognition of human rights therefore derives its justification
from the primordial demand that "[glovemment must not only treat people with
concern and respect, but with equal concern and respect." Id. Speaking in the
imperative voice, the demand requires no justification beyond itself. It is
axiomatic: a principle that is justifying, not justified. "The... argument for
political rights [is] the derivation of particular rights from the abstract right to
concern and respect taken to be fundamental and axiomatic." Id. at xv. Equality
is therefore simply not subject to justification.
128 Appeal to the self-evidency of a moral principle "is always a signal that
something has gone badly wrong with an argument." ALASDAIR MACINTYRE,
AFTER VIRTUE 67 (2d ed. 1981). Defining the principle of equality as axiomatic
merely sidesteps the problem of its rational justification. Through semantic
sleight of hand, the problem of justification is made to disappear by reflecting it
in a self-justifying mirror.
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contractual ethic of mutual regard whereby one promises to
regard another if the other similarly promises, but can marshal
no reasons against breach beyond that of expediency. At worst,
the self-regarding strategy generates merely an ethic of non-
aggression, which ethic need have regard only for those others
whose aggression is cause for concern. In neither case does the
self-regarding strategy provide justification for a universal
recognition of a dignity equally inherent in all human beings. It
provides justification neither for the universality of equal regard
for others, nor for sustaining this regard when it becomes
inexpedient to do so.
On this disconcerting inability to provide rational
justification for fundamental moral convictions, Friedrich
Nietzsche remarked: "Naivete: as if morality could survive when
the God who sanctions it is missing! The 'beyond' absolutely
necessary if faith in morality is to be maintained."129 Perhaps
more poignantly than any other thinker of the Western world to
date, Nietzsche realized the futility of basing nonreligious moral
claims on anything other than the will to do so. Absent God,
moral claims are a function of will, not reason. For Nietzsche,
rationally to justify moral claims, in particular the idea of
equality, is to avoid taking responsibility for them.130  The
principle of equality, the notion of a dignity equally inherent in
each human being, is not an idea that corresponds to any kind of
129 FREIDRICH NIETZSCHE, THE WILL TO POWER 147 (Walter Kaufman ed.,
Walter Kaufman & R.J. Hollingdale trans. 1967).
130 Nietzsche himself had little patience for the idea of equality. He
perceived it as morally debilitating, the product of the mass egoism of the weak:
[Tihe concept of the "equal value of men before God" is
extraordinarily harmful; one forbade actions and attitudes that were
in themselves among the prerogatives of the strongly constituted-as
if they were in themselves unworthy of men. One brought the entire
tendency of the strong into disrepute when one erected the protective
measures of the weakest (those who were weakest also when
confronting themselves) as a norm of value .... If one reflects with
some consistency, and moreover with a deepened insight into what a
"great man" is, no doubt remains that the church sends all "great
men" to hell-it fights against all "greatness of man." ... When
lesser men begin to doubt whether higher men exist, then the danger
is great! And one ends by discovering that there is virtue also among
the lowly and subjugated, the poor in spirit, and that before God men




moral reality. There simply is no reality which morality is
therefore obliged to recognize-no truth to which morality must
rationally conform.
Presupposition of this hypothesis: that there is no truth, that
there is no absolute nature of things nor a "thing-in-itself." This,
too, is merely nihilism-even the most extreme nihilism. It
places the value of things precisely in the lack of any reality
corresponding to these values and in their being merely a
symptom of strength on the part of the value-positers, a
simplification for the sake of life.' 3 '
For Nietzsche, the truth of reality is precisely false: a fiction
imposed upon existence for purposes other than truthful.
This is the greatest error that has ever been committed, the
essential fatality of error on earth: one believed one possessed a
criterion of reality in the forms of reason-while in fact one
possessed them in order to become master of reality, in order to
misunderstand reality in a shrewd manner. 132
"Truth" is therefore not something there, that might be
found or discovered, but something that must be created and that
gives a name to a process, or rather to a will to overcome that has
in itself no end-introducing truth, as a processus in infinitum,
an active determining-not a becoming conscious of something
that is in itself firm and determined. It is a word for the "will to
power."133
Without God, morality cannot viably be based on any kind of
moral truth provided by rationality. Morality is not a function of
reason. To believe so is profoundly to misconstrue what morality
is. Rational justification does not, and cannot supplant God-
neither philosophically nor historically. 3 4  Lacking divine
131 Id. at 14.
132 Id. at 315.
133 Id. at 298.
134 Arthur Allen Leff, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J.
1229, 1232 (1979).
[Tihere is discontent verging on despair whenever some theorist tries
to develop a system in which 'found' ethical or legal propositions are
to be treated as binding, but for which there is no supernatural
grounding. God's will is binding because it is His will that it be.
Under what other circumstances can the unexamined will of anyone
else withstand the cosmic 'says who' and come out similarly
dispositive? There are no such circumstances. We are never going to
get anywhere (assuming for the moment that there is somewhere to
get) in ethical or legal theory unless we finally face the fact that, in
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authorization, the final authority for the principle of equality can
therefore rest upon nothing other than its human authorization.
"The result of that realization is what might be called an
exhilarated vertigo, a simultaneous combination of an exultant
'e're free of God' and a despairing 'Oh God, we're free.' "135 If
justified by human words only, the moral proclamation of
equality and inalienable rights speaks only with the authority of
how loudly it is shouted. The central moral conviction of our
secularly civic society thus lacks any moral force beyond its mere
social imposition.
Noting this conceptual irony resident at the heart of
secularity, theologian Hans Kung remarked that:
[An ideologically neutral constitutional state] cannot justify
in terms of a philosophy or religion the very thing which it
must unconditionally assume: man's dignity and freedom.
Does it not therefore leave man completely without
bearings? Is there not a danger of an arbitrary pluralism
which easily ends in nihilism and disorder, where just
about everything is permitted?136
In actuality, it has lead to an arbitrary pluralism in which
just about everything is permitted privately, but where just
about nothing religious is permitted publically. Stephen Carter,
citing the American theologian, David Tracy, rightly contends
this is due to the ostensibly subversive character of religion,
whose transcendent moral authority may disoblige the religious
adherent from the social imposition of civic authority.137 "But
the Psalmist's words, there is no one like unto the Lord.
Id.
135 Id. at 1233.
136 KUNG, supra note 107, at 532.
137 Carter, supra note 27, at 1060.
Postmodern theologians see religion as subversive to the culture it
inhabits. As long as religion avoids the temptation to join its
authority to the authority of the state, it can indeed play a subversive
role, because it focuses the attention of the believer on a source of
moral understanding that transcends both the authority of positive
law and the authority of human moral systems. Quite simply,
religion in its subversive mode provides the believer with a
transcendent reason to question the power of the state. That is the
reason that the state will always try to domesticate religion: to avoid
being subverted.
Id. (referring to DAVID TRAcY, PLURALITY AND AMBIGUITY: HERMENEUTICS,
RELIGION, HOPE 1075 (1987)).
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Peter and the apostles answered, 'we must obey God rather than
men."' 138 Secular neutrality would thus domesticate religion in
order to neuter its transcendent moral force. Hence the "logic of
secular liberty" that has governed the twentieth century
jurisprudence of the Supreme Court on matters religious-a logic
anxious to privatize religion so as to excise its potentially
coercive if not subversive influence from the public order. 39 The
ultimate irony of this logic is that it devolves, and devolves only,
from a uniquely religious understanding of liberty.
IV. THE RELIGION OF LAW
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a
more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic
Tranquility, provide for the common defence [sic], promote
the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to
ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this
Constitution for the United States of America. 40
Although the text of the Constitution does not reference
God,' 4 ' the presumptive moral tenet underlying its aspiration to
138 Acts 5:29 (New Oxford Annotated Bible).
139 See McConnell, supra note 39, at 173. "A liberalism based on
individualism, independence, and rationalism thus has a tendency to see
traditional religion as authoritarian, irrational, and divisive-as a potential
threat to our democratic institutions rather than as one of their sturdiest
pillars, as was typically thought at the Founding." Id.
140 U.S. CONST. preamble.
141 See Derek H. Davis, Assessing the Proposed Religious Equality
Amendment, 37 J. CHURCH & ST. 493, 498 (1995)
While most of the Founding Fathers were men of profound religious
faith, they expressly declined to include the name of God in the
Constitution. They sought to create a secular, or neutral state, one
which excluded civil authority from religious affairs. Indeed, the
ancient requirement of bringing government under divine authority
was perspicuously absent in the Constitution, but this was no
oversight; it was the Founders' clear intention after lengthy
deliberations on the subject. Their clear aim was to make the federal
government incompetent and without authority in religious matters.
This in no way indicates, of course, that the document was hostile
toward religion .... The framers chose to omit the name of God from
the Constitution because in their minds, government derived not
from God but from the people. Because the nation was not founded on
religious truth, it would act to protect the right of all citizens to
believe and act upon divergent religious views, or even to live
without any religious beliefs.
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justice and liberty for all-albeit inconsistently for some (most
notably women and persons "other than free")--devolves from its
Judeo-Christian heritage. This religious heritage continues to
provide for the central moral conviction of our civic society
despite its secularization. 142
The primordially controlling religious concept for the Judeo-
Christian understanding of human being is its creation in the
image of God: "So God created man in his own image, in the
image of God he created him; male and female he created
them."143 By virtue of reflecting the divine image, absolute worth
is accorded human being.144 Judaism ascribes this absolute value
of humanity to every person.145 Within Judaism, however, the
absolute value of human being is not intrinsic to the being of
human being, but is divinely granted. Such divine regard may be
withheld or withdrawn depending upon fulfillment of God's will
through obedience to the revealed Law of God (Torah).146
Although absolute, Jewish moral regard for human beings is not
Id.
142 See Ritter, supra note 110, at 84-88.
143 Genesis 1:27 (New Oxford Annotated Bible).
144 "For at the core of the biblical system is the perception that the person is
of absolute and inviolable worth: created in the divine image." Michael
Fishbane, The Image of the Human and the Rights of the Individual in Jewish
Tradition, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS 17, 18 (Leroy S.
Rouner ed., 1988). Fishbane notes that the biblical attribution of absolute worth
to human being distinguished early Judaism from other Near Eastern religions.
Among the Babylonians, Assyrians, and Hittites, human life could be measured
economically in terms of the value of property or possessions: "[Llife and
property are commensurable values, used interchangeably in this legal system,
there being presupposed an exchange rate between persons and things." Id. The
Bible allows no such economic valuation of human being, and therefore permits
no legal substitution of property for human life: "Whoever sheds the blood of
man, by man shall his blood be shed; for God made man in his own image."
Genesis 9:6 (New Oxford Annotated Bible).
145 See Fishbane, supra note 144, at 17.
The fundamental presupposition of the rights of the person in
Judaism is a belief in the absolute and uncompromisable worth of
human life. This belief is grounded in the unique value of the
individual in the divine scheme of creation and is variously
articulated in both biblical literature and rabbinic tradition.
Id.
146 Judaism has generally confined its absolute regard for human life to
those of the Jewish faith who, moreover, properly fulfill their religious duties as
such. Id. at 25.
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universal. 147
Within its Christian heritage, however, divine regard for
human being is fulfilled by the Son of God in the person of Jesus
Christ. Through Christ, humanity is freed from sin, redeemed
before God, and exists in a state of grace. 148 Divine regard is
therefore realized not through obedience (to the law), but through
faith (in Christ): "'If you continue in my word, you are truly my
disciples, and you will know the truth, and the truth will make
you free."' 49 Christian freedom from Jewish law is therefore
"granted by God and received in faith."150 The Christian is free
from the burden of the law by virtue of living in Grace. "For the
law was given through Moses; grace and truth came through
Jesus Christ."151  This is the Christian faith. 52  Karl Barth
147 Not only has Jewish regard for the absolute value of human life been
historically confined to those of the Jewish faith who fulfill their religious duties
as such, but certain categories of persons were not historically accorded full
human status to begin with (e.g., idiots, minors, women, androgenes, etc.). Id.
at 26.
148 As the incarnation of divinity in humanity, the person of Jesus Christ
rectified the relationship between God and humankind-a rectification achieved
not by human fulfillment of the law, but by the Grace of God. Romans 8:3-4
(New Oxford Annotated Bible).
For the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus has set me free from
the law of sin and death. For God has done what the law, weakened
by the flesh, could not do: sending his own Son in the likeness of
sinful flesh and for sin, he condemned sin in the flesh, in order that
the just requirement of the law might be fulfilled in us, who walk not
according to the flesh but according to the Spirit.
Id. at 8:2-5. Rectification between God and humankind is thus entirely God's
doing. Through Christ, therefore, humankind is freed from the logic (or word) of
law, and lives in the logic (or word) of Spirit whereby divine Grace may be
enjoyed fully and eternally: "For the wages of sin is death, but the free gift of
God is eternal life in Christ Jesus our Lord." Romans 6:23 (New Oxford
Annotated Bible). In essence, the law of God is fulfilled in the person of Jesus
Christ, which fulfillment is accorded by the Grace of God to all of humankind.
149 John 8:31-32 (New Oxford Annotated Bible). The freedom referred to
here is freedom from the burden of having to fulfill the divine will through
obedience to God's law: "For freedom, Christ has set us free; stand fast
therefore, and do not submit again to the yoke of slavery." Galations 5:1 (New
Oxford Annotated Bible).
150 Trutz Rendtorff, Christian Concepts of the Responsible Self, in HUMAN
RIGHTS AND THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS 33, 39 (Leroy S. Rouner ed., 1988).
151 John 1:17 (New Oxford Annotated Bible).
152 See generally Matthew A. Ritter, God and Truth: A Conceptual Analysis
of Religious Commitment; Subversion of the Subject (1989) (discussing the
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properly construes the Christian faith accordingly:
To believe means to believe in Jesus Christ. But this
means to keep wholly and utterly to the fact that our
temporal existence receives and has and again receives its
truth, not from itself, but exclusively from its relationship
to what Jesus Christ is and does as our Advocate and
Mediator in God himself.... [Un faith we abandon
whatever we might otherwise regard as our standing,
namely, our standing upon ourselves.., for the real
standing in which we no longer stand on ourselves...
but... on the ground of the truth of God and therefore on
the ground of the reconciliation which has taken place in
Jesus Christ and is confirmed by him to all eternity. 153
The Christian understanding of being human is entirely a
function of the extraordinary value divinely granted to human
metaphysics, philosophical and theological, of the Christian faith) (unpublished
Dissertation, Yale University) (on file with author).
153 II KARL BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS, THE DOCTRINE OF GOD Pt.1, at 159
(T. H. L. Parker et al. trans., G. W. Bromiley & T. F. Torrance eds., 1957). The
truth of Jesus Christ is the truth of the reconciliation between the divine and
the human. For the Christian faith, Jesus Christ reveals this truth by virtue of
embodying this reconciliation. The truth that we humans are constitutionally
unable to realize is realized in the constitution of Jesus Christ. See Ritter, supra
note 152, at 158. "Jesus Christ is the atonement. But that means that He is the
maintaining and accomplishing and fulfilling of the divine covenant as executed
by God Himself." IV KARL BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS, THE DOCTRINE OF GOD
Pt. 4, at 34-35 (G. W. Bromiley trans., G. W. Bromiley & T. F. Torrance eds.,
1956). The person of Jesus Christ thus renders/reveals full accord between
divinity and humanity, and accordingly between God and all persons. Although
this accord is realized by Christ alone, it is revealed to humanity, the only
proper response to which is faith: "Believers 'are' the elect ... so far as they
bear witness to the truth, that is, to the elect man, Jesus Christ, and manifest
and reproduce and reflect the life of this one Elect." II KARL BARTH, CHURCH
DOGMATICS, THE DOCTRINE OF GOD Pt.2, at 347 (G. W. Bromiley et al. trans., G.
W. Bromiley & T. F. Torrance eds., 1957). Constitutionally unable to realize the
truth of the divine-human accord itself, truth is realized for humanity by Jesus
Christ. Humanity thus receives truth vicariously. Only through faith in its
revelation may this truth be acknowledged and received. "[T]he truth of man's
being... can consist in nothing other than in man's response with a
corresponding faithfulness to the way and work of God [in Jesus Christ], to
God's faithfulness." II KARL BARTH, CHURCH DOGMATICS, THE DOCTRINE OF GOD
Pt.1, at 207 (T. H. L. Parker et al. trans., G. W. Bromiley & T. F. Torrance eds.,
1957). Reconciliation between divinity and humanity is therefore accomplished
by God, through the person of Jesus Christ, but for the salvific benefit of all
human kind.
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being through the person of Jesus Christ. This value is not only
absolute; it is fait accompli. Through Christ, all persons exist in
the state of Grace by virtue of being human. Christ rectified
divine regard for human being. All humans participate in this
rectification. Divine regard for the individual is thus utterly
independent of anything the individual is or does. Grace is
prevenient; achieved not by human, but by divine effort in the
person of Christ. The absolute value of a person therefore pre-
exists any social differentia, and is consequently universal. All
persons are accordingly equal by virtue of no-thing-not by
virtue of anything a person is or does. Pre-established through
Christ, divine regard for humanity is absolute, universal, and
egalitarian.
Universal egalitarian regard for the absolute value of the
individual devolves from this radical freedom from the law
provided by Grace in the person of Jesus Christ. The Christian
community of faith proclaims this freedom:
But now the righteousness of God has been manifested
apart from the law, although the law and the prophets bear
witness to it, the righteousness of God through faith in
Jesus Christ for all who believe. For there is no distinction;
since all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God, they
are justified by his grace as a gift, through the redemption
which is in Jesus Christ, whom God put forward as an
expiation by his blood, to be received in faith.154
The Christian community of faith is itself the communal
incarnation of Christ as proclaiming redemption through
Christ. 155 As the communal incarnation of Christ, Christian
ethics is accordingly governed by the single moral dictate of
Christ as the Word of God: "A new commandment I give to you
that you love one another; even as I have loved you, that you also
love one another."156 The law-whereby the human is reconciled
with the divine-becomes through Christ the singular
commandment to be toward all others as Christ was: to love-
unconditionally, without regard to anything a person is or
1-4 Romans 3:21-25 (New Oxford Annotated Bible).
155 "For where two or three are gathered in my name, there I am in the
midst of them." Matthew 18:20 (New Oxford Annotated Bible).
156 John 13:34 (New Oxford Annotated Bible).
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does. 15 7  Christian love is granted through divine grace-a
function not of human achievement; Christian love is received in
gratitude-as profoundly undeserved.
Christian freedom from the law, however, does not mean
unlawfulness. On the contrary, Christian ethics merely deprives
the law of its soteriological significance-i.e., one may not acquire
redemption before God through acting lawfully. Religious
freedom from the law permits moral freedom for the law.
Obedience to the law serves not religiously to rectify oneself with
God, but morally to manifest one's rectitude with God. Having
been rectified with God through Christ, one is free to act
accordingly. Acting lawfully thus remains a primordially
religious activity;158 it is performed, however, not out of
religiously self-interested motives to right oneself with God, but
out of moral interest to act rightly in accordance with the divine
will as revealed through the law. 5 9  Hence the biblical
remonstration against religious hypocrisy: "Woe to you...
hypocrites! For you tithe mint and dill and cummin, and have
neglected the weightier matters of the law, justice and mercy and
faith . -160
157 See Matthew 22: 35-40 (New Oxford Annotated Bible) ("And one of [the
Pharisees], a lawyer, asked him [Jesus] a question, to test him [on Jewish law].
Teacher, which is the greatest commandment in the law?' And he said to him,
'You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul,
and with all your mind. This is the great and first commandment. And a second
is like it, You shall love your neighbor as yourself. On these two commandments
depend all the law and the prophets.'). When asked to clarify who one's
neighbor is, Jesus responds with the Good Samaritan parable, making it clear
that neighbor encompasses all others, no matter how detestable. Luke 10:29-37
(New Oxford Annotated Bible).
158 "'Did not your father eat and drink and do justice and righteousness?
Then it was well with him. He judged the cause of the poor and needy; then it
was well. Is not this to know me?' says the Lord." Jeremiah 22: 15-16 (New
Oxford Annotated Bible).
159 "Truly, I say to you, as you did it to one of the least of these my
brethern, you did it to me....' Iruly I say to you, as you did it not to one of the
least of these, you did it not to me." Matthew 25: 40, 45 (New Oxford Annotated
Bible).
160 Matthew 23:23 (New Oxford Annotated Bible). The Jewish prophetic
books are also replete with the same disaffection for self-serving religious
ceremony over moral rectitude with the divine will. Isaiah 1:10-17 (New Oxford
Annotated Bible) ("Hear the word of the Lord, . .. 'What to me is the multitude
of your sacrifices?' says the Lord;.. . 'Wash yourselves; make yourselves clean;
remove the evil of your doings from before my eyes; cease to do evil, learn to do
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The Judeo-Christian religious heritage thus dictates an
ethics of unconditional love for all persons as practiced through
just and merciful observance of the law. Judeo-Christian regard
for persons is requisitely absolute, universal, and egalitarian. It
is absolute by virtue of humanity's creation in the image of God-
by according divine worth to humankind; universal by virtue of
the reconciliation between God and humanity realized by the
person of Jesus Christ-vicariously fulfilling the law for all
persons; egalitarian by virtue of its just and lawful application to
all individuals-esteeming all individuals equally on the basis of
nothing a person otherwise is or does. Absolute, universal, and
egalitarian, Judeo-Christian regard for others-for all others-is
therefore a function of nothing-of no social differentia
whatsoever. At its root, the Judeo-Christian regard for persons
is not a human regard at all, but is a function rather of the divine
regard for humankind. In the Judeo-Christian heritage, this
divine regard for humanity is graciously absolute, universal, and
egalitarian.
The religious heritage of the Judeo-Christian tradition
therefore accords absolute, universal, and egalitarian value to all
individuals-simply and only by virtue of their being human.
The Judeo-Christian tradition accordingly provides the governing
religious ethic whereby inalienable rights are uniquely construed
to inhere absolutely, universally, and equally in all persons on
the basis of the inherent dignity of every individual human being
simply by virtue of being human and not by virtue of any other
defining social characteristic whatsoever. As our Declaration of
Independence succinctly iterates, unalienable rights are endowed
rights-endowed by the Creator.
Following the philosophical lead of Enlightenment
thinkers-most notably Immanuel Kant,161 and continuing
through theological efforts in the twentieth century-most
good; seek justice, correct oppression; defend the fatherless, plead for the
widow."'); Amos 5: 21-24 (New Oxford Annotated Bible) ("I hate, I despise your
feasts, and I take no delight in your solemn assemblies.... Take away from me
the noise of your songs; to the melody of your harps I will not listen. But let
justice roll down like waters, and righteousness like an ever-flowing stream.").
161 See generally, IMMANUEL KANT, RELIGION WITHIN THE LIMITS OF REASON
ALONE (Theodore M. Greene & Hoyt H. Hudson trans., Open Court Publishing
2d ed. 1960) (1793).
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notably by Paul Tillich, 162 secularism has persistently sought to
abstract moral principles from their religious trappings and
therefore provide them a properly rational basis, hence non-
contingent upon adherence to any particular sectarian dogma.163
Contemporary jurisprudence accordingly proclaims as its
fundamental moral principle an absolute, universal, and
egalitarian regard for the value of each human being, but which
regard refrains from reliance upon religious belief. In its
enthusiasm to elide religion from civic morality, secular esteem
for the inherent value of human being turns not on divine regard
for the human, but on human self-regard. Such human self-
regard consequently truncates the value of human being into its
abstract autonomous individuality: rational, independent, self-
sufficient, unencumbered and unconnected to others except by
choice. For secularism, the value of being human thus becomes
intrinsic to its humanity-therefore not a function of its
endowment by divinity.
Absent its religious foundation, however, this secular
egalitarian regard for all persons profoundly re-construes the
worth of the individual, and consequently yields an ethic that
inverts the Judeo-Christian regard for others into the protection
of privacy. The Judeo-Christian tradition construes the absolute
worth of the individual as a function of divine regard. The
truncation of this divine regard into human self-regard
consequently transforms an ethics driven by unconditional love of
others into an ethics driven by unconditional self-interest. When
worth is granted, it is received graciously; when owned, it is
demanded indignantly. In its secular anxiety to abstract the
human worth of the individual from all differentia, particularly
religious, civic morality collapses a uniquely Judeo-Christian
understanding of the absolute, universal and equal value of all
persons into the being of the individual. Secular morality is thus
a truncated inversion of religious morality.64 It transfers an
162 See generally, PAUL TILLICH, SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY (1951).
163 See, e.g., Rendtorff, supra note 150, at 43 (discussing of the Christian
content to modern "human rights": "Secularization as rationalization means to
express the Christian concept of freedom and responsibility in nontheological
language, thus giving human freedom a universal form.").
164 See KUNG, supra note 107, at 27.
The different spheres of life were seen less and less from the standpoint of a
higher world. They came to be understood in themselves and explained in terms
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other-regarding religious ethic into a self-regarding secular ethic.
Where the religious ethic of Judeo-Christianity pre-occupies itself
with conforming to the divine will,165 the secular ethic of
American culture pre-occupies itself with protecting and
promoting the private will of the abstract autonomous
individual.166
This secularly inverted truncation of religious morality
consequently relegates religion to the marginal realm of
adherence to religious dogma and ritual. By virtue of
secularizing the moral domain of religion, religion itself becomes
secularly construed as the residual system of beliefs and
practices explicitly attendant to religion. As our Supreme Court
has most recently and repeatedly averred: "the 'preservation and
transmission of religious beliefs and worship is a responsibility
and a choice committed to the private sphere.'' 167 Secularism
thus marginalizes religion, banishing it to the purely private
sphere, from which private sphere it exerts no moral claim upon
the public sphere and thus poses little subversive harm to the
civic order. 16
of their own immanent laws. Man's decisions and plans came to be based more
and more on these intrinsic laws and not on the supposed will of supramundane
powers. Id.
165 "Pray then like this: Our father who art in heaven, Hallowed be thy
name. Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done, On earth as it is in heaven. Give us
this day our daily bread; And forgive us our debts, As we also have forgiven our
debtors; And lead us not into temptation, But deliver us from evil." Matthew
6:9-13 (New Oxford Annotated Bible).
166 "The lessons of the First Amendment are as urgent in the modern world
as in the 18th Century when it was written. One timeless lesson is that if
citizens are subjected to state-sponsored religious exercises, the State['s] duty to
guard and respect that sphere of inviolable conscience and belief which is the
mark of a free people." Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992).
167 Sante Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 310 (2000) (quoting Lee,
505 U.S. at 589).
168 David Novak explains:
Unlike the right to openly practice one's own religious rites, which
can easily be tolerated as part of one's right to an individual
'lifestyle,' basing one's public moral stance on religious grounds
seems to make a claim on everyone in the society. When the question
of religion reaches this necessarily public level, even many
secularists who are usually tolerant of religion become quite fearful
because religion seems to be making a requirement of them, and
without their consent.
Novak, supra note 105, at 574.
Liberalism was born as a solution to the problem of religious
40 CATHOLIC LAWYER, No. 4
Nowhere is this marginalization more evident than in the
Court's misconstrual of the meaning of prayer, especially in
regard to our children, where "[a]s we have observed before,
there are heightened concerns with protecting freedom of
conscience from subtle coercive pressure in the elementary and
secondary public schools."169 For over half a century, the
Supreme Court has explicitly addressed itself to the issue of
religious activities in the public schools, perennially worried
whether "the State has crossed the line from permissible
accommodation to unconstitutional establishment. " 17 0 In each of
its decisions, however, the Court conceives of religious activity in
terms only of adherence to expressly religious dogma (from
refusal to grant deference to the flag' 7' to creationism 172) or
performance of an expressly religious ritual (from a moment of
silence 173 to an invocation174). The conceptual grammar within
which the Court addresses religious matters itself relegates
religion to its dogmas and rituals, which grammar therefore
dictates the Court's facile understanding of religion as a merely
private affair that ought not have public consequence. Indeed, in
a recent decision concerning prayer, the highest court in our land
for the constitutional adjudication of matters religious relies
upon the profound theological insights of an English Dictionary
for its explanation of prayer.175
Religion, however, has not primarily to do with its express
dogma and ritual. Religion has primarily to do with how
properly to live-within the Judeo-Christian heritage, in
pluralism. Freedom of conscience mattered a great deal because
religion mattered a great deal. To many, duties to God took
precedence over everything else in life. Modern liberalism tends to
protect religious freedom only when it does not matter-when it is
private and inconsequential.
McConnell, supra note 13, at 1265.
169 Lee, 505 U.S. at 592 (citing Sch. Dist. of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S.
203, 307 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578,
584 (1987); Bd. of Ed. of Westside Community Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226,
261-262 (1990) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
170 Lee, 505 U.S. at 629 (Souter, J., concurring).
171 See Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
172 See Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
173 See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
174 See Sante Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
175 See id. at 307 n.19 (2000) (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1190 (1993) (defining "invocation")).
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conformity to the divine will. As "the great religious act,"1 76
prayer encompasses the entire life of the religious person and
may scarcely be confined to its ritualized utterance. Indeed, the
Bible is replete with remonstrations against such a ritualization
of religiosity as demonstrating a profound misconstrual of how
properly to lead a religious life177-namely, a life of "justice and
176 Karl Rahner, Prayer, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THEOLOGY: THE CONCISE
SACRAMENTUM MUNDI 1268, 1272 (Karl Rahner ed. 1975). Karl Rahner, perhaps
the leading Catholic theologian of the twentieth century, further observes that
"the most basic fulfilment of an explicit relationship of man to God is
prayer. ... " KARL RAHNER, THE RELIGIOUS LIFE TODAY 47 (V. Green trans.,
1975). Prayer is thus not the merely ritualized activity whereby the religious
person ostensibly seeks to conform divine will to human will in petitioning for
this or that, but is rather the means whereby the human will seeks to conform
itself to the divine will in all matters of life. See JOHN MACQUARRIE, PRINCIPLES
OF CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 494, 496 (2d ed. 1977) ("In prayer as in worship, the
divine initiative is always to be recognized, so that what we do or say has the
character of response; and prayer, again like worship, is not some special
department of life, but continuous with all our activities."). Divine guidance in
all matters of life is thus definitive of the nature and character of prayer in all
its various forms: "from almost disrespectful argument (Genesis 18:23f.;
Jeremiah 14f.) to peaceful confidence in God's providence (Psalms 127), from
ardent supplication to despairing protest (Psalms 74:1ff.; Job 31), from
adoration, praise and thanksgiving (I Chronicles 29:31) to humble repentance (I
Chronicles 21:17; Psalms 51)." Karl Rahner, Prayer, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THEOLOGY: THE CONCISE SACRAMENTUM MUNDI 1268, 1269 (Karl Rahner ed.
1975). Prayer therefore manifests an "all-pervasive attitude, which may be
roughly described as confidence in the divine goodness, and at the same time a
sense of awe before the divine majesty." Id.
177 Isaiah 1:10-17 (New Oxford Annotated Bible).
Hear the word of the Lord .. W.What to me is the multitude of your
sacrifices? says the Lord; ... Wash yourselves; make yourselves
clean; remove the evil of your doings from before my eyes; cease to do
evil, learn to do good; seek justice, correct oppression; defend the
fatherless, plead for the widow.'
Id.
I hate, I despise your feasts, and I take no delight in your solemn
assemblies.... Take away from me the noise of your songs; to the
melody of your harps I will not listen. But let justice roll down like
waters, and righteousness like an ever-flowing stream.
Amos 5: 21-24 (New Oxford Annotated Bible).
And in his teaching he said, "Beware of the scribes, who like to go
about in long robes, and to have salutations in the market places and
the best seats in the synagogues and the places of honor at feasts,
who devour widows' houses and for a pretense make long prayers.
They will receive the greater condemnation.
Mark 13: 38-40 (New Oxford Annotated Bible). (New Oxford Annotated Bible);
Matthew 23:23 (New Oxford Annotated Bible) ("Woe to you, scribes and
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rightousness" 178 as obedient to the will of God in all matters. 179
Properly understood, prayer, and therefore religiosity itself, is
profoundly communal, hence public.180
Pharisees, hypocrites! For you tithe mint and dill and cumnin, and have
neglected the weightier matters of the law, justice and mercy and faith....").
178 "Did not your father eat and drink and do justice and righteousness?
Then it was well with him. He judged the cause of the poor and needy; then it
was well. Is not this to know me? says the Lord." Jeremiah 22: 15-16 (New
Oxford Annotated Bible).
179 "And in praying do not heap up empty phrases as the Gentiles do; for
they think that they will be heard for their many words.... Pray then like this:
Our father who art in heaven, Hallowed be thy name. Thy kingdom come. Thy
will be done, On earth as it is in heaven. Give us this day our daily bread; And
forgive us our debts, As we also have forgiven our debtors; And lead us not into
temptation, But deliver us from evil." Matthew 6:7-13 (New Oxford Annotated
Bible).
180 Although the Court has steadfastly resisted this proper construal of
religiosity, various Justices have from time to time acknowledged the
intrinsically communal character of religion. See Corp. of the Presiding Bishop
of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 341-
42 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("Religion includes important communal
elements for most believers.... For many individuals, religious activity derives
meaning in large measure from participation in a larger religious community.
Such a community represents an ongoing tradition of shared beliefs, an organic
entity not reducible to a mere aggregation of individuals." (citing Karl Barth,
The Christian Community and the Civil Community, in COMMUNITY, STATE AND
CHURCH 149 (1960)). As Justice Scalia stated in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577
(1992):
Church and state would not be such a difficult subject if religion
were, as the Court apparently thinks it to be, some purely personal
avocation that can be indulged entirely in secret, like pornography, in
the privacy of one's room. For most believers it is not that, and has
never been. Religious men and women of almost all denominations
have felt it necessary to acknowledge and beseech the blessing of God
as a people, and not just as individuals, because they believe in the
'protection of divine Providence,' as the Declaration of Independence
put it, not just for individuals but for societies; because they believe
God to be, as Washington's first Thanksgiving Proclamation put it,
the 'Great Lord and Ruler of Nations.'
Id. at 645 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Stephen Carter points out that the Court's
better jurisprudence on matters religious has consequently arisen not in the
context of its addressing the religion clauses, where it invariably misconstrues
the nature and character of religion as a merely private matter, but rather in
those cases involving the constitutionally fundamental right of parents to
inculcate religious values in their children through their education, where it
therefore observes the familial, if not thoroughly public nature and character of
religion. Carter, supra note 9, at 1203-06 (citing Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510 (1925) (using substantive due process to hold that parents had a
fundamental constitutional right to send their children to a parochial school));
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Although the Judeo-Christian religious heritage of our
American culture provides for its governing moral conviction-a
just and righteous regard for the absolute and universal value
equally attributed to all persons, the logic of secular liberty
employed by the Court effects a truncated inversion of that
religious ethic, which superordinates individuated privacy and
consequently subordinates religious piety. The civic order would
thus domesticate the religious order to preserve secular society.
CONCLUSION
"Church and state would not be such a difficult subject if
religion were, as the Court apparently thinks it to be, some
purely personal avocation that can be indulged entirely in secret,
like pornography, in the privacy of one's room."181
What is most disconcerting about the jurisprudence of our
highest court on matters religious is that it misconstrues not only
the nature and character of religion, but accordingly
misconstrues the nature and character of the legal presumptions
on the basis of which it adjudicates the relationship between law
and religion. During the course of the nineteenth century, in its
non-sectarian effort to distinguish the civic from the religious
order, the Court covertly valorized Protestant religiosity as the
constitutionally protected religious posture. During the course of
the twentieth century, in its secular effort to elide religious
influences from the civic order, the Court covertly valorized
secularity as the constitutionally protected posture on religion.
An exacerbated constitutional concern for the privacy of the
individual affronted with an increasingly pluralistic religious
order has finally relegated religion to the margins of the civic
order under a logic of secular liberty whereby egalitarian regard
for moral autonomy protects the public domain against a
potentially coercive theonomy. The Court's egalitarian regard for
the moral autonomy of the individual ironically devolves,
however, from its distinctive religious heritage, but which
devolution has effected a truncated inversion of an other-
regarding Judeo-Christian ethic into a self-regarding secular
ethic. A distressing lack of moral force, moreover, attaches to
Carter, supra note 27, at 1077-78 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972) (exempting Amish children from compulsory secondary education)).
181 Lee, 505 U.S. at 645 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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this secular ethic by virtue of its inability rationally to justify its
governing moral presumption of equality. Hence the accelerated
secular concern to neuter the transcendent moral authority of
religion by relegating piety to its dogma and ritual. The Court
thus misunderstands not only what religion is, but
misunderstands as well the theological etiology of the law
whereby it adjudicates religious matters.18 2
Two competing yet critical questions arise from these
considerations: first, whether the secular disregard for religion
effectively establishes a religion of secularity;18 3 and second,
whether the religious heritage of the law effectively establishes
religion through the law. 8 4
The secular disregard for religion has ostensibly yielded a
constitutionally protected stance on matters religious. If so, the
constitutional valorization of non-religion over religion becomes
highly problematic as the effective establishment of a "religion"
of secularity.'8 5 Although secularity is not properly conceived as
a religious posture, it is nonetheless a posture on religious
matters. Secularism is the attempt to abstract universal moral
values from their historically religious context and displace them
onto a humanistic rather than divinistic foundation-as a
function of reason rather than revelation. Secularity is thus a
truncated inversion of religiosity; it is not itself a form of
religiosity. Inasmuch, however, as secularism's consequent
superordinated regard for individuated privacy and accordant
182 See McConnell, supra note 8, at 656-57 ("[Tlhe 'principle of secular
rationale'. .. rests on inaccurate stereotypes and questionable epistemological
premises, and it would disenfranchise religious persons as full participating
members of the political community.").
183 See McConnell, supra note 13, at 1264 ("The peculiar hostility of secular
liberalism toward religion cannot be defended on liberal grounds-at least not
without converting liberalism into a prescription for conformity to a particular
way of life."); McConnell, supra note 39, at 172 ("[Lliberalism, understood as...
an ideology-the advocacy of a particular way of life ... requires liberal
citizens. Liberal citizens are those with liberal virtues... individualism,
independence, and rationality.").
184 See Novak, supra note 105, at 572 ("Can one have religious reasons for
the legitimacy of the secular polity that do not presuppose conversion to (or
reconfirmation of) a traditional religious community?").
185 Laycock, supra note 7, at 339 ("Shrinking the meaning of 'exercise' and
refusing to recognize [secular] ... views as 'religion' abandons both the liberty
and neutrality policies of the clauses and permits the government to take sides
in a core religious conflict.").
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subordinated regard for religious piety disdains, if not "bristles
with hostility"18 6 toward religiosity in the public domain, it
relegates religion to the private domain as a function only of
personal adherence to dogma and practice of ritual. Secularity
would thus publicly neuter the transcendent moral force of
theonomy in order to preserve the private moral autonomy of the
individual. Secularity therefore elevates its secular stance on
religion as the only appropriate public posture toward matters
religious and consequently inculcates this posture in its citizenry,
most notably through the secular public education of our
children. 8 7 The hermeneutics of this secular (dis)regard for
religion, however, manifests a profound misunderstanding of the
nature and character of religion, which misunderstanding
reflects a misconstrual of the relationship between the public and
the private. The valorization of public secularity over private
religiosity trades on an ill-conceived dichotomy between the
public and the private. 88 "Public" behavior is motivated by
"private" conviction. Covert constitutional protection of
secularity as the only appropriate public stance on private
186 Sante Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 318 (2000) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting).
187 "We domesticate the religions through the simple device of taking their
children." Carter, supra note 27, at 1084.
188 For a suggestive reflection on the "post-modern" critique of the
constitutional jurisprudence of law and religion, see McConnell, supra note 39,
at 182-188. "[Tlhe central insight of post-modernism is the exposure of
[secularity] ... as just another ideology." Id. at 182. Inasmuch as secularity is
not a "neutral" stance, its valorization as the only suitable public posture
becomes an effective endorsement of secularism. "If this post-modern insight is
correct, then secularism has no exclusive claim as the language of American
public life. Public religious discourse was discredited as arbitrary subjectivity
by a secular critique that pretends to be neutral and objective, but which
beneath that pretense is itself arbitrary and subjective." Id. at 183 (citing
Frederick M. Gedricks, The Religious, the Secular, and the Antithetical, 20 CAP.
U. L. REV. 113, 137 (1991). Secularity's valorization of public neutrality over
private religiosity turns on a presumptive dichotomy between the public and
the private: "Post-modernism tells us that the very distinction between the
public and the private is incoherent and destructive." McConnell, supra note 39,
at 183. McConnell ostensibly despairs of any viable constitutional guidance
provided by such post-modern insights: "Once the public-private distinction is
obliterated--once private power and public power are treated as equally
threatening and once the government is understood to act whenever it refrains
from interfering with the acts of private individuals-religious freedom cases
become hopelessly indeterminate." Id. at 185.
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matters religious, which protects the free private exercise of
religion only when it does not publicly matter, therefore works
not so much to establish a religion of secularity as to dis-
establish religion. This secular dis-establishment of religion
evidences an enlightened ignorance regarding the religious
heritage of the law whereby it adjudicates matters religious.
Acknowledgment of the theological justification for the governing
moral tenets of our nation's law, however, would certainly not
require the religious conversion of those who subscribe to these
tenets for non-religious reasons. On the one hand, religiosity is
not primarily a function of dogmatic theology; on the other hand,
neither lawful nor moral behavior necessarily presupposes
religious conviction. Such acknowledgment, however, does entail
recognizing that the moral force of our law is not intrinsic to
itself-that law is authorized, ultimately, not by reason, but by
revelation. Secularity has not freed the law from religion; it has
served rather to truncate the moral authority of law into its mere
social imposition and thus invert an ethics of piety into an ethics
of privacy that marginalizes religion and neuters its
transcendent authority. Recognition of the law's religious
legitimation preserves the transcendent moral force of law and
serves therefore to obviate the mere force of law. Hans Kung
rightly observes: "Theo-nomy is the condition of the possibility of
the moral auto-nomy of man in secular society."189  The
rationality of law thus remains properly accountable to the
religiosity of its authorization. Theological justification for law
works not an establishment of religion; it works an establishment
of law-law freed from the tyranny of those who enforce the law.
Only thus may the "Blessings of Liberty" remain secure. 190
POSTSCRIPT
And when you pray, you must not be like the hypocrites;
for they love to stand and pray in the synagogues and at
the street corners, that they may be seen by men. Truly,
I say to you, they have received their reward. But when
you pray, go into your room and shut the door and pray
189 KUNG, supra note 107, at 536.
190 U.S. CONST. preamble. The religion clauses, properly construed, are thus
consonant with the balance of the Constitution vis-a-vis its governing concern to
delimit the power of the State.
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to our Father who is in secret; and your Father who
sees in secret will reward you. 191
As the Grand Inquisitor sought to arrest and banish Christ,
so has secularity sought to elide religious influences from the
public domain. The Inquisitor feared the dreadful freedom
Christ provided; secularity similarly fears the transcendent
exertion of theonomy over moral autonomy. The Inquisitor
wished instead through the imposition of law to satisfy human
anxiety for a universal unity; secularity seeks as well to establish
through the imposition of law a common secularist ideology by
neutering divisive religious influences. Our Supreme Court,
however, ought not endorse the secular misconstrual of the
relationship between law and religion; under constitutional
dictate, moreover, our Supreme Court may not subscribe to the
consequent secular effort to disestablish religion. The
Constitution proscribes the establishment of religion; it
prescribes the free exercise thereof. Although the government
may not mandate any particular religion or religion in general,
all things religious must nevertheless be permitted
constitutionally-a constitutional permission that operates,
however, within the Judeo-Christian heritage of egalitarian
regard for the absolute value of all persons. 192
Contrary, then, to the judicial disinclination to allow
religious activity in the public schools for fear of its coercive
effects, such activity must be constitutionally permitted. The
upshot of these reflections on the issue of student-initiated
religious activities in the public schools is that such activity must
be allowed its free exercise. Religiosity is simply not a merely
private affair; it is profoundly public. The exercise of religion
may therefore not be constitutionally circumscribed out of the
public domain. Although a public school may not itself, as a
governmental institution, endorse any particular religion or
religion in general, it may also not endorse no religion at all. To
the extent that public schools endorse a secular ideology of dis-
establishing religion, they are themselves unconstitutional. 193
191 Matthew 6:5-6 (New Oxford Annotated Bible).
192 This theonomous moral restraint on the constitutional protection of
religious autonomy obviates jurisprudential distress over such things as
religious human sacrifice.
193 See Laycock, supra note 7, at 348 ("Religious speakers are free to use
public forums and to speak in places where they have a right to be. They are
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The religious proscription against the public prayers of the
hypocrite must remain a religious proscription; under our
Constitution, it may not be a legal proscription.
free to make religious arguments in political debates; any other rule would be
transparent viewpoint discrimination.").
